Personal Health Information Shared Via Social Networking: The Gap between Reality and Protection by Pool, Madison M.
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Crowdfunding: Fleecing the American Masses 
limited because it is ill equipped to handle the influx of crowdfunding 
fraud. 
The proposed exemption under H.R. 2930 is riddled with flaws 
and it exposes the average American to unbearable risks without the 
counterbalancing protections of the securities laws. H.R. 2930_ makes 
it easier for issuers to target middle to lower class investors, yet it 
fails to properly protect such individuals who need it the most. As 
such the exemption makes it easier for financially unsophisticated 
' .. investors to gamble their life savings on highly speculative securities, 
thereby undermining eighty years of securities doctrine. I realize our 
economy desperately needs a boost, but an exemption for equity 
crowdfunding is not the answer; rather, it is a political knee-jerk 
reaction that will wreak havoc on the securities industry and the 
economy as a whole. Congress still has time to reconsider its actions; 
but if it goes forward with the exemption, get ready to watch the 
fleecing of the American masses and the next securities blooper of the 
21st century. 
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PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION 
SHARED VIA SOCIAL NETWORKING: 
THE GAP BETWEEN REALITY AND PROTECTION1 
Madison M. Pool 
ABSTRACT 
Control over personal information has long been valued in 
American society as a lynchpin of privacy. Traditional causes of 
action evolved to protect this privacy in a world confined by the 
bounds of physical space. However, these approaches fail to 
adequately remedy the harms confronted in the modern world of 
cyberspace. When Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996, it recognized the revolutionary 
impact electronic medical records would have on individuals' control 
over their personal health illformation (PHI) in the health care 
context. This legislation not only laid the foundation for protection of 
PHI through the HIP AA Privacy Rule, it also statutorily validated 
this long-held American value of control over personal information in 
the form of protections for PHI. Although the HIP AA Privacy Rule 
established the first set of federal standards for protection of this 
highly valued category of information, it remains limited to a narrow 
group of covered entities. 
Not only is PHI disclosed in social networking not protected by 
current federal regulations, it is also largely unprotected by state law. 
State law protections are still predominated by antiquated physical-
space based causes of action that ignore the realities of social 
networking in a context unconstrained by geographic borders. 
Combined, the shortcomings of federal legislative protections and the 
outdated state protections result in a gap between the realities of 
social networking and the available protections for PHI. Social 
networking's ubiquity and the expectations of privacy held by users 
and promoted by the sites themselves challenge the values of privacy 
and protection for PHI. When the HIP AA Privacy Rule was 
established in 1996, Facebook did not exist. However, the legislation 
was envisioned as a floor on which to build protections as technology 
1. I am grateful to Professor Ani Satz for her advice and mentorship on 
this project, and to Julia Hueckel, Bonnie Scott, and Francesca Pisano 
for their support and detailed comments on drafts. I would also like to 
thank Wes Floyd and Brett Snyder for sharing their expertise. Finally, I 
would like to thank Jeff Pool for his patience, input, and tireless support 
throughout this process. 
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and electronic storage of PHI evolved. Social networking is just such 
an evolution. 
This Note proposes the adoption of federal regulations to protect 
PHI disclosed through online social networking. From rapidly and 
unpredictably changing privacy settings, to sale of information to 
advertisers, there · are many ways in which PHI is disclosed and 
disseminated further than the user's known or intended audience. If 
protection for PHI does not keep pace with the development of online 
social networking, users will increasingly find themselves without 
meaningful remedies to address emerging harms. 
INTRODUCTION 
Tom is a social networking user. 2 He restricted his privacy 
settings so that only a small group of his "friends" could see his 
postings. These postings included a discussion of his struggles with 
diabetes. Without warning, the site changed its privacy settings and 
Tom's postings-including his diabetes dialogue-became visible to 
everyone who subscribes to the site and hundreds of millions of other 
users, including his boss. Not only were his postings visible, but his 
picture also began appearing on other users' pages next to 
advertisements for diabetes medications. In frustration, Tom 
attempted to delete his profile and erase all this information from the 
site. To his dismay, the site informed him that the information could 
not be deleted. Suddenly, the privacy settings Tom had been so 
vigilant in monitoring seemed like a sham. 
While Tom is merely an illustrative example, the problems are 
real and mirror the experiences of millions of social networking users.3 
2. 
3. 
This example is fictional and the name invented; any resemblance to a 
real person or story is coincidental. For a real life example, see Julia 
Angwin & Steve Stecklow, "Scrapers' Dig Deep for Data on the Web, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2010 9:30 PM), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052748703358504575544381288117888.html ("'I felt 
totally violated,' says Bilal Ahmed . . . who used PatientsLikeMe to 
connect with other people suffering from depression. He used a 
pseudonym on the message boards, but his PatientsLikeMe profile 
linked to his blog, which contains his real name."). 
Facebook has more than one billion monthly active users, with 618 
million active daily users as of December, 2012. Key Facts, FACEBOOK 
(Dec. 31, 2012), http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts. As of September 
8, 2011, Twitter reached 100 million active users. @Twitter, One 
Hundred Million Voices, TWITTER BLOG (Sept. 8, 2011, 9:32 AM), 
http://blog.twitter.com/2011/09/one-hundred-million-voices.html. 
[hereinafter @Twitter Voices]. Discontent with such practices has been 
discussed for several years. See, e.g., Facebook Reveals 'Simplified' 
Privacy Changes, BBC (May 26, 2010), 
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With social networking on the rise,4 issues of informational privacy 
are also increasing.5 Yet despite social networking pitfalls, a 
fascinating phenomenon has arisen-users are increasing activity.6 
Social networking is becoming more ingrained and incorporated into 
everyday life: socially, politically, and even in the workplace.7 Many 
users, like Tom, continue to believe their information is far more 
protected than it is. The reality of obtuse privacy policies, limited 
user control, and widespread distribution of personal information to 
third parties are obscured by the sites' promotions advertising privacy 
control and "sharing but like real life. "8 These implications of 
4. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10167143 (praising increased privacy 
settings options but criticizing the disregard of personal data sales to 
advertisers); see also Kevin Bankston, Facebook's New Privacy Changes: 
The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 9, 
2009), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/facebooks-new-privacy-
changes-good-bad-and-ugly (criticizing new Facebook privacy changes as 
"clearly intended to push Facebook users to publicly share even more 
information than before" and reducing user control over "personal 
data.") (emphasis in original). However, there had been no resolution 
until the recent settlement agreement with the Federal Trade 
Commission ("FTC"). See Emil Protalinski, Facebook settles with FTC 
over default privacy settings, ZDNET (Nov. 29, 2011, 10:09 AM), 
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-settles-with-ftc-over-
default-privacy-settings/5667( discussing the settlement terms). 
For example, Twitter reported an average of 460,000 new accounts 
created per day from mid-February, 2011, to mid-March, 2011 and a 
1823 increase in the number of mobile users from March 2010 to March 
2011. @Twitter, #numbers, TWITTER BLOG (Mar. 14, 2011, 11:38 AM) 
http://blog.twitter.com/2011/03/numbers.html. 
5. See, e.g., Maria Aspan, How Sticky Is Membership on Facebook? Just 
Try Breaking Free, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2008), 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2008/02/11/technology / 
llfacebook.html?pagewanted=all (discussing difficulties with 
permanently deleting information from Facebook); see also Alex Pell, 
Hey, Facebook, Just Let Go of Me, SUNDAY TIMES (Mar. 16, 2008), 
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/the_web/ 
article3553216.ece (discussing lack of control of personal information 
resulting from the option to "deactivate," but not permanently delete, a 
Face book profile). 
6. See, e.g., Tweet, tweet! Using Twitter to Build Career Connections 
Now, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 2011, at 8; Joe Dysart, Viral Information: 
Interactive press releases really spread the word, ABA J, Oct. 2011, at 
32; @Twitter Voices, supra note 3. 
7. See, e.g., @Twitter Voices, supra note 3; Tweet, tweet! Using Twitter to 
Build Career Connections Now, supra note 6, at 8; Dysart, supra note 
6, at 32. 
8. Google, Google+: Sharing but like real life, YouTUBE (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GRmDGvdkg8E ("Sharing but like 
real life." quote appears at time code 1:21). 
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privacy, which mask the sites' actual practices, undermine users' 
legitimate privacy expectations.9 Disturbingly, current law does not 
adequately protect social networking users. 10 
One area in which this lack of protection is particularly worrisome 
is personal health information, which Americans attach great 
importance to protecting.11 Americans value protecting privacy 
through control of personal information generally, 12 but PHI has 
received extra attention over the past two decades. 13 Control over 
personal information is particularly pertinent to PHI because of its 
uniquely high potential for misuse, embarrassment, pain, . and 
discrimination.14 However, protection for PHI is largely lacking in 
social networking. With the continued increase in social networking 
and the lack of protection under current law, a gap has resulted 
between social networking realities and PHI protections. 
Current protection for PHI falls into two categories: federal 
regulatory protection and state protection. 15 Both of these categories 
fall short of preseiying the control over PHI that American society 
expects.16 First, current federal regulations are 11.mited only to 
"covered entities"17 and do not apply to social networking. Second, 
9. See infra Part III.A. 
10. See infra Part IL 
11. Health and Human Serv. ("HHS") Standards for Privacy of Individually 
Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,464 (Dec. 28, 
2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164) [hereinafter "2000 Privacy 
Standards]" ("Among different sorts of personal information, health 
information is among the most sensitive."). 
12. Id. ("A right to privacy in personal information has historically found 
expression in American law."). 
13. Id. ("Among different sorts of personal information, health information 
is among the most sensitive."). While much has been written about 
privacy issues with the advent of electronic medical records, other 
potential disclosures of personal health information have yet to be 
addressed. For example, both Nick Terry (Hall Render Professor of 
Law and Co-director of the William S. and Christine S. Hall Center for 
Law and Health at Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of 
Law) and Sharona Hoffman (Professor of Law and Bioethics and Co-
Director of the Law-Medicine Center at Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law) have written prolifically on this issue. See 
infra notes 24 and 101. 
14. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464 ("Among different 
sorts of personal information, health information is among the most 
sensitive."). 
15. See infra Part IL 
16. See infra Part IL 
17. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,476-77 (defining covered 
entities as "health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care 
providers"). 
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state protections fail for two reasons: the differing protection among 
states does not align with the reality that social networking is largely 
unrestricted by state and even national borders, 18 and traditional 
causes of action apply imperfectly, if at all, to privacy needs in an 
online social networking setting.19 These causes of action are 
characterized by a focus on physical space and retrospective rather 
than preventative measures, neither of which comport with the 
realities of harms in online social networking. 20 
This Note addresses the novel issue of protection for PHI in social 
networking21 and proposes the adoption of federal regulations to keep 
pace with online social networking's rapid evolution and provide 
protection for PHI disclosed in this setting. Part I of this Note 
highlights the value Americans place on preserving informational 
privacy by controlling personal information. Privacy is a value 
strongly embedded both in American legal history22 and in American 
cultural understanding,23 and PHI is one area in which value of 
18. See, e.g., Proto v. Hamic, No. FSTCV106005537S, 2011 WL 1992202 
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 10, 2011) (Connecticut resident brought claim 
against former student now residing in Texas; court found jurisdiction 
under Connecticut long-arm statute). In addition, Face book reports that 
"approximately 803 of [its] monthly active users are outside the United 
States and Canada." Fact Sheet, FACEBOOK (Feb. 19, 2012), 
http:/ /newsroom.fb.com/ content/ default.aspx?N ewsAreaid=22. 
19. See, e.g., Patricia Sanchez Abril, A My(Space) of One's Own: On 
Privacy and Online Social Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73 
(2007-08); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CAL. L. 
REV. 2007 (2010); Spencer D. Kiggins, Privacy in Health Information 
Technology in the Age of Electronic Informational Piracy, 10 
TELEHEALTH L.J. 33 (2009). 
20. Cf. Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S. 650, 655, n.6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2010) (citing Cordero v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 866 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Sup. Ct. 
NY Co. 2008) (finding no common law right of privacy in New York)) 
and Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 803 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(finding use of plaintiff's profile pictures and names sufficient to state a 
claim under "long recognized a right to protect one's name and likeness 
against appropriation by others"). 
21. For example, MCGRADY ON SOCIAL MEDIA makes only one mention of 
HIP AA ("legislated' privacy rights are derived from several federal and 
state laws ... including ... HIPAA"). PAUL D. MCGRADY, JR., 
MCGRADY ON SOCIAL MEDIA§ 5.03 (also making no mention of personal 
health information). 
22. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); 2000 
Privacy Standards, supra note 11 at 82,464 (There are "enduring values 
in American law that relate to privacy," including a common law or 
statutory right to privacy recognized in every state, and "[m]any of the 
most basic protections in the Constitution."). 
23. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11 at 82,464. 
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control over personal information is particularly evident.24 The belief 
that PHI should be afforded privacy protection has been statutorily 
validated by the enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 and the Health Information Technology 
for Economic and Clinical Health Act.25 This Part will discuss the 
values that underlie the passage of these two Acts to show the 
importance American society places on protecting PHI. 
Part II explores the shortcomings of current privacy protections 
for PHI shared via social networking. It will discuss the protections 
offered by current regulations and show how this protection is limited 
only to narrow categories of actors in the health care field, falling 
short of the necessary protection for PHI. in social networking. This 
Part will also show that state protections are insufficient for two 
reasons. First, this Part will demonstrate how having differing causes 
of action across states does not align with the reality that social 
networking is largely unrestricted by state and even national borders. 
Second, it will discuss the failings of the available causes of action-
specifically, their antiquated bases in physical space and failure to 
provide meaningful remedies through adherence to retroactive privacy 
protections. 
Part III of this Note discusses the modern trend of social 
networking and suggests that this is a viable area in which to extend 
protections. This Part will show the value of protecting PHI disclosed 
in social networking settings by addressing four realities of social 
networking: (1) social networking is on the rise; (2) social networking 
is valuable; (3) users expect that they will have control over their 
information; and ( 4) this expectation of privacy is undermined by the 
sites' conflicting privacy representations. This Part will further show 
the value of extending protections into this area by highlighting 
harms that will result to social networking users if the disconnect 
between expected and actual protections remain unaddressed. These 
harms include an inability to delete personal information after it is 
posted, disclosure beyond the intended audience through unexpected 
24. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gilman & James C. Cooper, There is a Time to 
Keep Silent and a Time to Speak, the Hard Part is Knowing Which is 
Which: Striking the Balance Between Privacy Protection and the Flow 
of Health Care Information, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 279, 
284 (2009-10); see also Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In 
Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic 
Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 335-36 (2007). 
25. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA; HIPAA 
Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160 & 164 (2010) [hereinafter HIPAA 
Privacy Rule]; and Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Title XIII, Div. A & Title IV, 
Div. B (2009) [hereinafter HITECH] (part of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009). 
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and non-optional privacy changes, and the sale of personal 
information to third party sites. 
Part IV will advance a proposal for federal regulations to remedy 
the shortcomings of the current law. The proposed regulations would 
address the gap in the law in three ways. First, the regulations would 
require meaningful privacy disclosures and truthful advertising by the 
social networking sites. Second, the regulations would establish 
guidelines for PHI use and distribution by social networking sites and 
third-party affiliates; Third, the regulations would provide meaningful 
causes of action and remedies for users and sites alike. This Part will 
also discuss the advantages of such a federal regulatory scheme, 
including filling the current gap in the law, providing meaningful 
dispute resolution options and remedies, and setting clear 
expectations for all parties involved. 
Finally, Part V further outlines the beneficial ramifications of 
such a solution.26 With the rapid advancements in social networking, 
data management, and patient-managed electronic medical records, 
such regulations could serve as a benchmark for mitigating other 
harms before they arise. 
I. CONTROL OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION: A MODERN 
RECOGNITION OF HISTORICAL AMERICAN PRIVACY VALUES 
Privacy is a value strongly embedded both in American legal 
history27 and in American cultural understanding; "it speaks to . . . 
individual and collective freedom. "28 From informational privacy to 
physical privacy, "the rights of the individual" have been at the 
"forefront of [American] democracy. "29 One way these rights are 
respected is through a privacy-based theory of control. 30 Privacy 
through control can apply both to controlling one's physical space and 
to controlling access to one's personal information.31 The right to 
26. While this Note focuses on PHI disclosed in a social networking setting, 
the proposed regulatory scheme could be adapted to fit other categories 
of information and other data-mining settings. 
27. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
28. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464. 
29. Id. 
30. See, e.g., Avner Levin & Patricia Sanchez Abril, Two Notions of 
Privacy Online, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001 (2008-09); Patricia 
Sanchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online 
Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689 (2010); Patricia 
Sanchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. 
J. L. & TECH. 1 (2007-08). 
31. See Levin & Abril, supra note 30, at 1007-08 (discussing ways of 
thinking about the concept of "privacy"). This Note focuses on 
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control over personal information is particularly evident.24 The belief 
that PHI should be afforded privacy protection has been statutorily 
validated by the enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 and the Health Information Technology 
for Economic and Clinical Health Act.25 This Part will discuss the 
values that underlie the passage of these two Acts to show the 
importance American society places on protecting PHI. 
Part II explores the shortcomings of current privacy protections 
for PHI shared via social networking. It will discuss the protections 
offered by current regulations and show how this protection is limited 
only to narrow categories of actors in the health care field, falling 
short of the necessary protection for PHI. in social networking. This 
Part will also show that state protections are insufficient for two 
reasons. First, this Part will demonstrate how having differing causes 
of action across states does not align with the reality that social 
networking is largely unrestricted by state and even national borders. 
Second, it will discuss the failings of the available causes of action-
specifically, their antiquated bases in physical space and failure to 
provide meaningful remedies through adherence to retroactive privacy 
protections. 
Part III of this Note discusses the modern trend of social 
networking and suggests that this is a viable area in which to extend 
protections. This Part will show the value of protecting PHI disclosed 
in social networking settings by addressing four realities of social 
networking: (1) social networking is on the rise; (2) social networking 
is valuable; (3) users expect that they will have control over their 
information; and ( 4) this expectation of privacy is undermined by the 
sites' conflicting privacy representations. This Part will further show 
the value of extending protections into this area by highlighting 
harms that will result to social networking users if the disconnect 
between expected and actual protections remain unaddressed. These 
harms include an inability to delete personal information after it is 
posted, disclosure beyond the intended audience through unexpected 
24. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gilman & James C. Cooper, There is a Time to 
Keep Silent and a Time to Speak, the Hard Part is Knowing Which is 
Which: Striking the Balance Between Privacy Protection and the Flow 
of Health Care Information, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 279, 
284 (2009-10); see also Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In 
Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic 
Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 335-36 (2007). 
25. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA; HIPAA 
Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160 & 164 (2010) [hereinafter HIPAA 
Privacy Rule]; and Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Title XIII, Div. A & Title IV, 
Div. B (2009) [hereinafter HITECH] (part of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009). 
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and non-optional privacy changes, and the sale of personal 
information to third party sites. 
Part IV will advance a proposal for federal regulations to remedy 
the shortcomings of the current law. The proposed regulations would 
address the gap in the law in three ways. First, the regulations would 
require meaningful privacy disclosures and truthful advertising by the 
social networking sites. Second, the regulations would establish 
guidelines for PHI use and distribution by social networking sites and 
third-party affiliates; Third, the regulations would provide meaningful 
causes of action and remedies for users and sites alike. This Part will 
also discuss the advantages of such a federal regulatory scheme, 
including filling the current gap in the law, providing meaningful 
dispute resolution options and remedies, and setting clear 
expectations for all parties involved. 
Finally, Part V further outlines the beneficial ramifications of 
such a solution.26 With the rapid advancements in social networking, 
data management, and patient-managed electronic medical records, 
such regulations could serve as a benchmark for mitigating other 
harms before they arise. 
l. CONTROL OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION: A MODERN 
RECOGNITION OF HISTORICAL AMERICAN PRIVACY VALUES 
Privacy is a value strongly embedded both in American legal 
history27 and in American cultural understanding; "it speaks to . . . 
individual and collective freedom. "28 From informational privacy to 
physical privacy, "the rights of the individual" have been at the 
"forefront of [American] democracy. "29 One way these rights are 
respected is through a privacy-based theory of control.30 Privacy 
through control can apply both to controlling one's physical space and 
to controlling access to one's personal information.31 The right to 
26. While this Note focuses on PHI disclosed in a social networking setting, 
the proposed regulatory scheme could be adapted to fit other categories 
of information and other data-mining settings. 
27. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
28. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464. 
29. Id. 
30. See, e.g., Avner Levin & Patricia Sanchez Abril, Two Notions of 
Privacy Online, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001 (2008-09); Patricia 
Sanchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online 
Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689 (2010); Patricia 
Sanchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. 
J. L. & TECH. 1 (2007-08). 
31. See Levin & Abril, supra note 30, at 1007-08 (discussing ways of 
thinking about the concept of "privacy"). This Note focuses on 
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privacy through control of personal information "has historically 
found expression in American law. "32 This tradition continued with 
the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIP AA).33 
As a nation, the United States places high value on protecting 
PHI.34 PHI includes "information ... that ... relates to the past, 
present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an 
individual. "35 This information is extremely personal and intimate, 
and its disclosure has a uniquely high potential for misuse, 
embarrassment, pain, and discrimination.36 Statutes passed over the 
last two decades have provided PHI with privacy protection. 37 
Congress passed HIP AA in part to establish "standards with respect 
to the privacy of individually identifiable health information. "38 
In passing HIPAA, "Congress recognized the importance of 
protecting the privacy of health information given the rapid evolution 
of health information systems."39 Pursuant to this goal, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Service (HHS) promulgated final 
rules and regulations to establish such standards.40 Published on 
August 14, 2002, the regulations are now known as the HIP AA 
informational privacy exercised via control over access to one's personal 
information. 
32. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464. 
33. HIP AA, supra note 25. 
34. See supra notes 23 and 24. 
35. HIP AA Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at § 160.103. 
36. See 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464 ("Among different 
sorts of personal information, health information is among the most 
sensitive."). 
37. See generally HIP AA, supra note 25A; HIP AA Privacy Rule, supra note 
25; and HITECH, supra note 25. 
38. HIPAA, supra note 25, at § 264(a-b) ("The recommendations under 
subsection (a) shall address at least the following: (1) The rights that an 
individual who is a subject of individually identifiable health 
information should have. (2) The procedures that should be established 
for the exercise of such rights. (3) The uses and disclosures of such 
information that should be authorized or required."). Individually 
identifiable health information is health information "[t]hat identifies the 
individual; or ... [w]ith respect to which there is a reasonable basis to 
believe the information can be used to identify the individual." HIP AA 
Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at § 160.103. 
39. HHS Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pts. 160 & 164) [hereinafter Privacy Standards Modifications]. 
40. Id. at§ 264(c); HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 25. 
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Privacy Rule41 and "create[d], for the first time, a floor of national 
protections for the privacy of [individuals'] most sensitive 
information-health information. "42 
One of the HIPAA Privacy Rule's foremost purposes is "[t]o 
protect and enhance the rights of consumers by providing them access 
to their health information and controlling the inappropriate use of 
that information. "43 HHS recognized the area had a pressing need for · 
informational protection when it promulgated the regulations. 44 The 
HIP AA Privacy Rule sets out comprehensive requirements regarding 
the use and disclosure of protected health information. 45 To reiterate 
that the HIP AA Privacy Rule is a minimum standard, HHS added 
that it "creates a framework of protection that can be strengthened 
by both the federal government and by states as health information 
systems continue to evolve. "46 
In explaining the need for . the HIP AA Privacy Rule, HHS noted 
that "few experiences are as fundamental to liberty and autonomy as 
maintaining control over when, how, to whom, and where you disclose 
personal material. "47 The HIP AA Privacy Rule is a landmark 
regulation that created the first set of federal standards for protection 
of PHI,48 and it recognizes the importance of protecting this category 
of information. 49 
41. HHS issued the Privacy Rule to implement requirements of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. See U.S. Dept. of 
HHSS, Office for Civil Rights, Summary of the HIP AA Privacy Rule, 1 
(2003), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy /hipaa/understanding/ 
summary/privacysummary.pdf .. [hereinafter PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY] 
(A slight misnomer: the HIPAA "Privacy" Rule provides standards for 
"individuals' privacy rights to understand and control how their health 
information is used" that in operation preserve the right of 
informational control and confidentiality rather than strict privacy.). 
42. Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 38. 
43. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,463. 
44. 2000 Privacy· Standards, supra note 11, at 82,462 ("These protections 
will begin to address growing public concerns that advances in electronic 
technology .and evolution in the health care industry are resulting, or 
may result, in a substantial erosion of the privacy surrounding 
individually identifiable health information .... "). 
45. Id. 
46. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464. 
47. Id. 
48. Id.; see also PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY, supra note 41 at 1. 
49. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11 at 82,463 ("In enacting HIP AA, 
Congress recognized the fact that administrative simplification cannot 
succeed if we do not also protect the privacy and confidentiality of 
personal health information."); see also, PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY, supra 
note 41, at 1 (balancing an assurance of proper protection for 
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privacy through control of personal information "has historically 
found expression in American law. "32 This tradition continued with 
the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA).33 
As a nation, the United States places high value on protecting 
PHI.34 PHI includes "information ... that ... relates to the past, 
present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an 
individual. "35 This information is extremely personal and intimate, 
and its disclosure has a uniquely high potential for misuse, 
embarrassment, pain, and discrimination.36 Statutes passed over the 
last two decades have provided PHI with privacy protection.37 
Congress passed HIP AA in part to establish "standards with respect 
to the privacy of individually identifiable health information. "38 
In passing HIP AA, "Congress recognized the importance of 
protecting the privacy of health information given the rapid evolution 
of health information systems."39 Pursuant to this goal, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Service (HHS) promulgated final 
rules and regulations to establish such standards.40 Published on 
August 14, 2002, the regulations are now known as the HIPAA 
informational privacy exercised via control over access to one's personal 
information. 
32. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11~ at 82,464. 
33. HIP AA, supra note 25. 
34. See supra notes 23 and 24. 
35. HIP AA Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at§ 160.103. 
36. See 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464 ("Among different 
sorts of personal information, health information is among the most 
sensitive."). 
37. See generally HIP AA, supra note 25A; HIP AA Privacy Rule, supra note 
25; and HITECH, supra note 25. 
38. HIPAA, supra note 25, at § 264(a-b) ("The recommendations under 
subsection (a) shall address at least the following: (1) The rights that an 
individual who is a subject of individually identifiable health 
information should have. (2) The procedures that should be established 
for the exercise of such rights. (3) The uses and disclosures of such 
information that should be authorized or required."). Individually 
identifiable health information is health information "[t]hat identifies the 
individual; or ... [w]ith respect to which there is a reasonable basis to 
believe the information can be used to identify the individual." HIP AA 
Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at§ 160.103. 
39. HHS Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pts. 160 & 164) [hereinafter Privacy Standards Modifications]. 
40. Id. at§ 264(c); HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 25. 
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Privacy Rule41 and "create[d], for the first time, a floor of national 
protections for the privacy of [individuals'] most sensitive 
information-health information. "42 
One of the HIP AA Privacy Rule's foremost purposes is "[t]o 
protect and enhance the rights of consumers by providing them access 
to their health information and controlling the inappropriate use of 
that information. "43 HHS recognized the area had a pressing need for · 
informational protection when it promulgated the regulations. 44 The 
HIP AA Privacy Rule sets out comprehensive requirements regarding 
the use and disclosure of protected health information. 45 To reiterate 
that the HIP AA Privacy Rule is a minimum standard, HHS added 
that it "creates a framework of protection that can be strengthened 
by both the federal government and by states as health information 
systems continue to evolve. "46 
In explaining the need for . the HIP AA Privacy Rule, HHS noted 
that "few experiences are as fundamental to liberty and autonomy as 
maintaining control over when, how, to whom, and where you disclose 
personal material. "47 The HIP AA Privacy Rule is a landmark 
regulation that created the first set of federal standards for protection 
of PHI,48 and it recognizes the importance of protecting this category 
of information. 49 
41. HHS issued the Privacy Rule to implement requirements of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. See U.S. Dept. of 
HHSS, Office for Civil Rights, Summary of the HIP AA Privacy Rule, 1 
(2003), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy /hipaa/understanding/ 
summary/privacysummary.pdf .. [hereinafter PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY] 
(A slight misnomer: the HIPAA "Privacy" Rule provides standards for 
"individuals' privacy rights to understand and control how their health 
information is used" that in operation preserve the right of 
informational control and confidentiality rather than strict privacy.). 
42. Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 38. 
43. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,463. 
44. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,462 ("These protections 
will begin to address growing public concerns that advances in electronic 
technology .and evolution in the health care industry are resulting, or 
may result, in a substantial erosion of the privacy surrounding 
individually identifiable health information .... "). 
45. Id. 
46. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464. 
47. Id. 
48. Id.; see also PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY, supra note 41 at 1. 
49. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11 at 82,463 ("In enacting HIP AA, 
Congress recognized the fact that administrative simplification cannot 
succeed if we do not also protect the privacy and confidentiality of 
personal health information."); see also, PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY, supra 
note 41, at 1 (balancing an assurance of proper protection for 
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The HIP AA Privacy Rule's framework was expanded with the 
passage of the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, providing more protection for health 
information maintained electronically.50 Individuals now have the 
statutory right to know who has accessed their health information, a 
response to the pitfalls of electronically maintaining medical records.51 
The requirement illustrates the value placed on privacy protection for 
electronic, sensitive information,52 as HHS recognized a fundamental 
right to privacy embodied in PHI. 53 
However, despite PHI's sensitive nature, the current regulatory 
protections are limited. They do not extend beyond a few narrow 
classes of "covered entities,"54 and do not address the social 
networking issues. Additionally, state laws do not offer adequate 
protection for PHI shared in social networking interactions, with 
provisions that "vary significantly from state to state" often failing to 
provide basic protections. 55 These shortcomings were the reason for 
developing federal regulations to safeguard PHI in the first place.56 
As noted by HHS, "Privacy is a fundamental right. As such, it must 
be viewed differently than any ordinary economic good. "57 . The 
privileges and stringent privacy requirements established under these 
regulations are in place even though covered entities and their 
business associates are providing valuable services to individuals.58 
individuals' health information while permitting "important uses" of 
that information is a "major goal" of the Privacy Rule). 
50. HITECH Act, 123 Stat. 230, P.L. 115-5 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. 
300jj-11) ("National Coordinator shall perform the duties under 
subsection ( c) in a manner consistent with the development of a 
nationwide health information technology infrastructure that allows for 
the electronic use and exchange of information"). 
51. 123 Stat. 230, P.L. 115-5, §13405(c)(l)(B) (codified as amended 42 
U.S.C. 17935) ("[A]n individual shall have a right to receive an 
accounting of disclosures ... "). 
52. Id. 
53. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464. ("Privacy is a 
fundamental right."). 
54. Id. at 82,476-77 (These covered entities are "health plans, health care 
clearinghouses, and certain health care providers .... "). 
55. Id. at 82,463-64 (including access to a user's own medical records). 
56. Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182. ("[H]ealth 
privacy protections are intended to provide consumers with similar 
assurances that their health information, including genetic. information, 
will be properly protected."). 
57. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11 at 82,464. 
58. See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 19; Kiggins, supra note 19; and 
Gilman & Cooper, supra note 24. 
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These requirements highlight the collective belief that individuals' 
PHI deserves strong protection. 59 
II. CURRENT PROTECTIONS FOR PERSONAL HEALTH 
INFORMATION ARE INSUFFICIENT 
Despite the sensitivity of PHI and the belief that it should be 
protected,60 current protections are limited.61 Both the current federal 
regulatory protections and state protections fall short of providing 
adequate control over this valuable information. 62 Combined with 
social networking's rapid evolution, a significant gap has resulted 
between users' expected and actual control over PHI shared online. 63 
A. Federal Regulations: The HIPAA Privacy Rule and the HITECH 
Act 
The first category of protection for PHI is federal: HIP AA and the 
HITECH Act.64 
Despite the high value American society places on protecting the 
privacy of PHI, these protections are limited. As currently written, 
these standards only apply to certain "covered entities"65 and their 
"business associates. "66 "Covered entities" are limited to health plans, 
health care clearinghouses, and certain health care providers. 67 The 
HIP AA Privacy Rule also applies these privacy requirements to the 
"business associates"68 of covered entities.69 However, they do not 
59. See generally supra note 66 & 67. 
60. See supra Part I. 
61. See supra Part I. 
62. See supra Part I. 
63. See Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182 (noting 
consumer's concerns about the privacy of their personal information). 
See also 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,462 (discussing 
how advances in technology affect individually identifiable health 
information). 
64. See supra Part I. 
65. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,476-77 (These covered 
entities are "health plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health 
care providers .... "). 
66. HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at§ 164.502(e) (allowing a covered 
entity to disclose PHI to a business associate contingent upon 
"satisfactory assurance that the business associate will appropriately 
safeguard the information"). 
67. Id. at § 160.103. 
68. Id. (defining business associate as "a person who: (i) On behalf of such 
covered entity . . . other than in the capacity of a member of the 
workforce of such covered entity . . . performs, or assists in the 
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The HIPAA Privacy Rule's framework was expanded with the 
passage of the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, providing more protection for health 
information maintained electronically.50 Individuals now have the 
statutory right to know who has accessed their health information, a 
response to the pitfalls of electronically maintaining medical records.51 
The requirement illustrates the value placed on privacy protection for 
electronic, sensitive information,52 as HHS recognized a fundamental 
right to privacy embodied in PHI.53 
However, despite PHI's sensitive nature, the current regulatory 
protections are limited. They do not extend beyond a few narrow 
classes of "covered entities, "54 and do not address the social 
networking issues. Additionally, state laws do not offer adequate 
protection for PHI shared in social networking interactions, with 
provisions that "vary significantly from state to state" often failing to 
provide basic protections. 55 These shortcomings were the reason for 
developing federal regulations to safeguard PHI in the first place.56 
As noted by HHS, "Privacy is a fundamental right. As such, it must 
be viewed differently than any ordinary economic good. "57 . The 
privileges and stringent privacy requirements established under these 
regulations are in place even though covered entities and their 
business associates are providing valuable services to individuals.58 
individuals' health information while permitting "important uses" of 
that information is a "major goal" of the Privacy Rule). 
50. HITECH Act, 123 Stat. 230, P.L. 115-5 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. 
300jj-11) ("National Coordinator shall perform the duties under 
subsection ( c) in a manner consistent with the development of a 
nationwide health information technology infrastructure that allows for 
the electronic use and exchange of information"). 
51. 123 Stat. 230, P.L. 115-5, §13405(c)(l)(B) (codified as amended 42 
U.S.C. 17935) ("[A]n individual shall have a right to receive an 
accounting of disclosures ... "). 
52. Id. 
53. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464. ("Privacy is a 
fundamental right."). 
54. Id. at 82,476-77 (These covered entities are "health plans, health care 
clearinghouses, and certain health care providers .... "). 
55. Id. at 82,463-64 (including access to a user's own medical records). 
56. Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182. ("[H]ealth 
privacy protections are intended to provide consumers with similar 
assurances that their health information, including genetic. information, 
will be properly protected."). 
57. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11 at 82,464. 
58. See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 19; Kiggins, supra note 19; and 
Gilman & Cooper, supra note 24. 
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These requirements highlight the collective belief that individuals' 
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II. CURRENT PROTECTIONS FOR PERSONAL HEALTH 
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protected,60 current protections are limited.61 Both the current federal 
regulatory protections and state protections fall short of providing 
adequate control over this valuable information. 62 Combined with 
social networking's rapid evolution, a significant gap has resulted 
between users' expected and actual control over PHI shared online. 63 
A. Federal Regulations: The HIPAA Privacy Rule and the HITECH 
Act 
The first category of protection for PHI is federal: HIP AA and the 
HITECH Act.64 
Despite the high value American society places on protecting the 
privacy of PHI, these protections are limited. As currently written, 
these standards only apply to certain "covered entities"65 and their 
"business associates. "66 "Covered entities" are limited to health plans, 
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entities are "health plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health 
care providers .... "). 
66. HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at§ 164.502(e) (allowing a covered 
entity to disclose PHI to a business associate contingent upon 
"satisfactory assurance that the business associate will appropriately 
safeguard the information"). 
67. Id. at § 160.103. 
68. Id. (defining business associate as "a person who: (i) On behalf of such 
covered entity . . . other than in the capacity of a member of the 
workforce of such covered entity . . . performs, or assists in the 
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provide protection outside of these narrow categories, thus failing to 
adequately protect PHI from disclosure in other settings.70 
While the HIP AA Privacy Rule and the HITECH Act- are steps in 
the right direction of establishing federal standards for privacy 
protection of PHI, they fall short of protecting PHI and privacy in the 
social networking setting. When HHS promulgated the HIP AA 
Privacy Rule, it noted consumers' increasing concerns "about the 
privacy of their personal information, "71 specifically as "advances in 
electronic technology ... are resulting, or may result, in a substantial 
erosion of the privacy surrounding individually identifiable health 
information. . . . "72 HHS envisioned the HIP AA Privacy Rule as a 
floor that could be built upon as new technologies developed and 
offered challenges to protecting PHI.73 Building on this floor with 
new federal regulations to protect PHI disclosed in social networking 
is a natural progression in addressing the increasing role played by 
social networking in our society.74 
B. State Protections: Traditional Causes of Action 
Because there are no federal regulations that directly protect PHI 
outside of the narrow parameters described,75 most allegations of 
inappropriate use or disclosure of PHI in a social networking context 
are addressed by state law.76 Protection for PHI varies across the 
performance of: (A) A function or activity involving the use or 
disclosure of individually identifiable health information, including 
claims processing or administration .... "). 
69. Id. Generally, authorizations are required before protected health 
information may be disclosed by covered entities. See id. at §§ 
164.502(a), 164.508(a). 
70. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 24 (discussing inadequate 
government response to protecting PHI). 
71. Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182 (noting that 
the Privacy Rule creates a basic level of national protections to address 
public concern over privacy of their personal information). 
72. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,462. 
73. Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182 ("[T]he 
Privacy Rule creates, for the first time, a floor of national protections 
for the privacy of [consumers'] most sensitive information-health 
information."). 
74. See Levin & Abril, supra note 30, at 1004 (discussing the reasonableness 
of the ge11.eral public's expectation of privacy over their personal online 
information and their use of social networking sites to disclose personal 
information). · 
75. See supra Part II.A. 
76. See generally Abril, supra note 19, at 78 (discussing state tort law as 
recourse for those wronged from disclosure of personal information via 
social networking); see also Nicholas P. Terry, Physicians and Patients 
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states and typically neither fully covers issues that arise in health care 
systems nor reaches other potential abuses of PHI. 77 Traditional 
common law causes of action are the most prevalent way plaintiffs 
petition courts for redress, and these causes of action have developed 
on a state-by-state basis.78 However, this paradigm neglects important 
realities for addressing harms that occur in online social networking. 
These traditional causes of action fail to provide protection for 
PHI disclosed in social networking in two ways. First, traditional 
causes of action vary by state largely ignoring the reality that social 
networking is largely unrestricted by state and even national 
borders.79 Second, traditional causes of action apply imperfectly, if at 
all, to privacy needs in an online social networking setting because of: 
(1) outdated restrictions based on control of physical space, and (2) 
sole retrospective addressing of harms.80 
1. Differing Protections Across the States: Adherence to State Borders 
The lack of federal guidelines for privacy protection has resulted 
in a fragmented system across the states. 81 In discussing the 
importance of privacy for PHI, HHS noted that "[r]ules requiring the 
protection of health privacy ... have been enacted primarily by the 
states ... [and] vary significantly from state to state and typically 
apply to only part of the health care system. "82 HHS also noted that 
many of these state laws "fail to provide such basic protections as 
ensuring a patient's legal right to see a copy of his medical record. "83 
Congress determined that privacy protection for PHI was sufficiently 
important to enact the first set of federal privacy protections for 
PHI. 84 Fragmented protection for health records was not acceptable; 
Who "Friend" or "Tweet": Constructing a Legal Framework for Social 
Networking in a Highly Regulated Domain, 43 IND. L. REV. 285 (2010). 
77. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,463 (noting wide variation 
in state law protection for health information). 
78. See Abril, supra note 19, at 78; see also Terry, supra note 76. 
79. See, e.g., Proto, supra note 18; see also Fact Sheet, supra note 18. 
80. See sources cited supra note 19. 
81. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,463; see also Strahilevitz, 
supra note 19 (discussing the need for a re-examination and re-
unification of privacy law generally to better accomplish the purpose of 
privacy torts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 153 
(1971) (noting that privacy rights are usually. determined by law of the 
state where the plaintiff \\fas domiciled if the matter complained of was 
published in that state). 
82. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,463. 
83. Id. at 82,464. 
84. Id. at 82,463 (outlining the purposes underlying congressional enactment 
of the 2000 Privacy Standards). 
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provide protection outside of these narrow categories, thus failing to 
adequately protect PHI from disclosure in other settings.70 
While the HIP AA Privacy Rule and the HITECH Act· are steps in 
the right direction of establishing federal standards for privacy 
protection of PHI, they fall short of protecting PHI and privacy in the 
social networking setting. When HHS promulgated the HIP AA 
Privacy Rule, it noted consumers' increasing concerns "about the 
privacy of their personal information, "71 specifically as "advances in 
electronic technology ... are resulting, or may result, in a substantial 
erosion of the privacy surrounding individually identifiable health 
information. . . . "72 HHS envisioned the HIP AA Privacy Rule as a 
floor that could be built upon as new technologies developed and 
offered challenges to protecting PHI.73 Building on this floor with 
new federal regulations to protect PHI disclosed in social networking 
is a natural progression in addressing the increasing role played by 
social networking in our society. 74 
B. State Protections: Traditional Causes of Action 
Because there are no federal regulations that directly protect PHI 
outside of the narrow parameters described, 75 most allegations of 
inappropriate use or disclosure of PHI in a social networking context 
are addressed by state law. 76 Protection for PHI varies across the 
performance of: (A) A function or activity involving the use· or 
disclosure of individually identifiable health information, including 
claims processing or administration .... "). 
69. Id. Generally, authorizations are required before protected health 
information may be disclosed by covered entities. See id. at §§ 
164.502(a), 164.508(a). 
70. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 24 (discussing inadequate 
government response to protecting PHI). 
71. Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182 (noting that 
the Privacy Rule creates a basic level of national protections to address 
public concern over privacy of their personal information). 
72. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,462. 
73. Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182 ("[T]he 
Privacy Rule creates, for the first time, a floor of national protections 
for the privacy of [consumers'] most sensitive information-health 
information."). 
74. See Levin & Abril, supra note 30, at 1004 (discussing the reasonableness 
of the general public's expectation of privacy over their personal online 
information and their use of social networking sites to disclose personal 
information). · 
75. See supra Part II.A. 
76. See generally Abril, supra note 19, at 78 (discussing state tort law as 
recourse for those wronged from disclosure of personal information via 
social networking); see also Nicholas P. Terry, Physicians and Patients 
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states and typically neither fully covers issues that arise in health care 
systems nor reaches other potential abuses of PHI. 77 Traditional 
common law causes of action are the most prevalent way plaintiffs 
petition courts for redress, and these causes of action have developed 
on a state-by-state basis.78 However, this paradigm neglects important 
realities for addressing harms that occur in online social networking. 
These traditional causes of action fail to provide protection for 
PHI disclosed in social networking in two ways. First, traditional 
causes of action vary by state largely ignoring the reality that social 
networking is largely unrestricted by state and even national 
borders.79 Second, traditional causes of action apply imperfectly, if at 
all, to privacy needs in an online social networking setting because of: 
(1) outdated restrictions based on control of physical space, and (2) 
sole retrospective addressing of harms.80 
1. Differing Protections Across the States: Adherence to State Borders 
The lack of federal guidelines for privacy protection has resulted 
in a fragmented system across the states. 81 In discussing the 
importance of privacy for PHI, HHS noted that "[r]ules requiring the 
protection of health privacy . . . have been enacted primarily by the 
states ... [and] vary significantly from state to state and typically 
apply to only part of the health care system. "82 HHS also noted that 
many of these state laws "fail to provide such basic protections as 
ensuring a patient's legal right to see a copy of his medical record. "83 
Congress determined that privacy protection for PHI was sufficiently 
important to enact the first set of federal privacy protections for 
PHI. 84 Fragmented protection for health records was not acceptable; 
Who "Friend" or "Tweet": Constructing a Legal Framework for Social 
Networking in a Highly Regulated Domain, 43 IND. L. REV. 285 (2010). 
77. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,463 (noting wide variation 
in state law protection for health information). 
78. See Abril, supra note 19, at 78; see also Terry, supra note 76. 
79. See, e.g., Proto, supra note 18; see also Fact Sheet, supra note 18. 
80. See sources cited supra note 19. 
81. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,463; see also Strahilevitz, 
supra note 19 (discussing the need for a re-examination and re-
unification of privacy law generally to better accomplish the purpose of 
privacy torts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 153 
(1971) (noting that privacy rights are usually. determined by law of the 
state where the plaintiff vyas domiciled if the matter complained of was 
published in that state). 
82. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,463. 
83. Id. at 82,464. 
84. Id. at 82,463 (outlining the purposes underlying congressional enactment 
of the 2000 Privacy Standards). 
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similarly, fragmented protection for PHI shared in social networking 
should also be unacceptable. These protections, which are not 
nationally consistent, do not align with the reality that social 
networking is largely umestricted by state and national borders.s5 
The need for protection of PHI in social networking is not limited 
to a particular state, as these issues regularly traverse state borders.s6 
Consider, for example, Proto v. Hamic, s7 a Connecticut case in which 
a martial arts instructor brought an action against a former student 
who had moved to Texas.ss The instructor alleged that the student, 
while residing in Texas, posted unfavorable content about him on the 
student's Facebook and Twitter accounts.s9 The court found personal 
jurisdiction under Connecticut's long-arm statute, holding that 
because the student knew the teacher was a Connecticut resident, and 
because the social networking postings could result in a harm to the 
teacher in Connecticut, the long-arm provision for committing "a 
tortious act within the state" was satisfied.90 When discussing online 
issues, state lines cease to carry the same weight as in the non-cyber 
world. 91 
Despite social networking's ability to transcended geographic 
borders, protections for users are still affected by geography, even 
within states. One example illustrative of this artificial division is 
California users' inability to determine what uses of their likenesses or 
posted information are permissible. Compare, for example, Cohen v. 
FacebookfJ2 with Fraley v. Facebook. 93 Both cases arose in the 
Northern District of California, but in different divisions: Cohen in 
the San Francisco division and Fraley in the San Jose division.94 
Interestingly, even this small geographic distinction resulted in 
85. See supra note 19 
86. . See supra note 19. 
87. See Proto, supra note 18, at *1. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at *1-2 ("[T]he plaintiff alleges that the defendant 'has designed and 
orchestrated an extensive campaign, using the Internet, to disseminate 
false, misleading, and disparaging information about [the plaintiffj, and 
[the plaintiffj 's businesses, for the purpose of damaging [the plaintiffj 's 
professional reputation, driving away [the plaintiff] 's clients and 
affiliates, and gaining an unfair competitive advantage."') (citation 
omitted). 
90. Id. at *10-26. 
91. See supra note 19. 
92. Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 10-5282 RS, 2011 WL 5117164 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 27, 2011). 
93, Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F.Supp.2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
94. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164; Fraley, 830 F.Supp.2d 785. 
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differing outcomes. Both cases concerned the use of Facebook users' 
profile pictures for promotion of a new Facebook function. 
In Cohen, users' names and pictures were distributed to others 
through a "Friend Finder" function designed to attract new users by 
linking current users to other people who they might know. 95 Gaining 
additional users resulted in more advertising revenue for Facebook96 
Ultimately, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for 
misappropriation of their likenesses and unfair emichment.97 
In Fraley, users' names and profile pictures were paired with 
products and companies they had "liked," which were then displayed 
to the users' friends. 9s In contrast to Cohen, the Fraley plaintiffs' 
claims of misappropriation and unjust emichment were allowed to 
move forward. 99 
The two claims were notably similar: both alleged Facebook had 
misappropriated the users' likenesses and unjustly benefitted from 
that use. 100 Both also took issue with Facebook's conduct because of 
the ultimate economic advantage to Facebook.101 Yet, the cases were 
inconsistently resolved. 102 Cases like these underscore the difficulty 
for individuals and social networking sites alike to know what is an 
appropriate use of personal information under the current legal 
framework. 
2. Imperfect Application: The Limits of Physical Space and 
Retrospective Causes of Action 
The traditional causes of action available to plaintiffs are ill-fitted 
to this virtual world. Causes of action such as intrusion upon 
seclusion· and defamation are often used in attempts to address 
wrongs arising from inappropriate disclosure of personal information 
online. 103 Scholars have observed that these traditional causes of 
action apply imperfectly, if at all, to privacy needs in an online social 
networking setting. 104 Two primary shortcomings highlight this 
imperfect fit. First, these traditional causes of action focus on privacy 
95. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *2. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at *3. 
98. Fraley, 830 F.Supp.2d at 797. 
99. Id. at 815. 
100. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1; Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790. 
101. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1; Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790. 
102. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1; Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790. 
103. See Abril, supra note 19, at 78-80 (discussing traditional torts and their 
potential application in the online realm). 
104. See supra notes 19-20. 
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similarly, fragmented protection for PHI shared in social networking 
should also be unacceptable. These protections, which are not 
nationally consistent, do not align with the reality that social 
networking is largely unrestricted by state and national borders.s5 
The need for protection of PHI in social networking is not limited 
b d S6 to a particular state, as these issues regularly traverse state or ers. 
Consider, for example, Proto v. Hamic, s7 a Connecticut case in which 
a martial arts instructor brought an action against a former student 
who had moved to Texas.ss The instructor alleged that the student, 
while residing in Texas, posted unfavorable content about him on the 
student's Facebook and Twitter accounts.sg The court found personal 
jurisdiction under Connecticut's long-arm statute, holding that 
because the student knew the teacher was a Connecticut resident, and 
because the social networking postings could result in a harm to the 
teacher in Connecticut, the long-arm provision for committing "a 
tortious act within the state" was satisfied.go When discussing online 
issues, state lines cease to carry the same weight as in the non-cyber 
world.g1 
Despite social networking's ability to transcended geographic 
borders, protections for users are still affected by geography, even 
within states. One example illustrative of this artificial division is 
California users' inability to determine what uses of their likenesses or 
posted information are permissible. Compare, for example, Cohen v. 
Facebook92 with Fraley v. Facebook.g3 Both cases arose in the 
Northern District of California, but in different divisions: Cohen in 
the San Francisco division and Fraley in the San Jose division.g4 
Interestingly, even this small geographic distinction resulted in 
85. See supra note 19 
86. See supra note 19. 
87. See Proto, supra note 18, at *1. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at *1-2 ("[T]he plaintiff alleges that the defendant 'has designe~ and 
orchestrated an extensive campaign, using the Internet, to dissemmate 
false, misleading, and disparaging information about [the plaintiffj, and 
[the plaintiffj 's businesses, for the purpose of damaging [the plaintiffj 's 
professional reputation, driving away [the plaintiffj 's clients and 
affiliates, and gaining an unfair competitive advantage."') (citation 
omitted). 
90. Id. at *10-26. 
91. See supra note 19. 
92. Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 10-5282 RS, 2011 WL 5117164 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 27, 2011). 
93, Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F.Supp.2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
94. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164; Fraley, 830 F.Supp.2d 785. 
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differing outcomes. Both cases concerned the use of Facebook users' 
profile pictures for promotion of a new Facebook function. 
In Cohen, users' names and pictures were distributed to others 
through a "Friend Finder" function designed to attract new users by 
linking current users to other people who they might know.g5 Gaining 
additional users resulted in more advertising revenue for Facebookg6 
Ultimately, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for 
misappropriation of their likenesses and unfair enrichment.g7 
In Fraley, users' names and profile pictures were paired with 
products and companies they had "liked," which were then displayed 
to the users' friends.gs In contrast to Cohen, the Fraley plaintiffs' 
claims of misappropriation and unjust enrichment were allowed to 
move forward. gg 
The two claims were notably similar: both alleged Facebook had 
misappropriated the users' likenesses and unjustly benefitted from 
that use. 100 Both also took issue with Facebook's conduct because of 
the ultimate economic advantage to Facebook.101 Yet, the cases were 
inconsistently resolved. 102 Cases like these underscore the difficulty 
for individuals and social networking sites alike to know what is an 
appropriate use of personal information under the current legal 
framework. 
2. Imperfect Application: The Limits of Physical Space and 
Retrospective Causes of Action 
The traditional causes of action available to plaintiffs are ill-fitted 
to this virtual world. Causes of action such as intrusibn upon 
seclusion · and defamation are often used in attempts to address 
wrongs arising from inappropriate disclosure of personal information 
online.103 Scholars have observed that these traditional causes of 
action apply imperfectly, if at all, to privacy needs in an online social 
networking setting. 104 Two primary shortcomings highlight this 
imperfect fit. First, these traditional causes of action focus on privacy 
95. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *2. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at *3. 
98. Fraley, 830 F.Supp.2d at 797. 
99. Id. at 815. 
100. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1; Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790. 
101. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1; Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790. 
102. Cohen, 2011 WL 5117164, at *1; Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 790. 
103. See Abril, supra note 19, at 78-80 (discussing traditional torts and their 
potential application in the online realm). 
104. See supra notes 19-20. 
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with regard to physical space, 105 which is largely incompatible with an 
online setting. Second, these causes of action are retrospective rather 
than preventative. 106 
First, the focus on physical space does not comport with the 
online medium. Traditionally, privacy has focused on control of 
physical space. 107 Privacy could be attained through an individual's 
ability to control access to his physical space or to control the 
distribution of information about himself within that space. 108 The 
tort of Intrusion upon Seclusion epitomizes the traditional focus on 
physical space in privacy protection. An actor is liable for invasion of 
privacy when he "intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon 
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns . 
. . if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. "109 
While the definition provides that the intrusion could be a physical 
intrusion or "otherwise," courts have not expanded this concept 
beyond its traditional basis in physical space.110 
This physical space framework is a poor fit for social networking. 
Online social networking is conducted in cyberspace; a virtual world 
that does not fit within the physical bounds that this cause of action 
envisions. 111 In addition, social networking is predicated on sharing 
information, 112 which is antithetical to seclusion.113 Social networking 
105. See Abril, supra note 19, at 79-80 (discussing how a plaintiff would need 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a physical area to bring an action 
under traditional tort laws); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 652 (1977). 
106. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (defining 
"defamatory communication" and discussing how the communication 
must have actually been made). 
107. See supra notes 19-20. 
108. See, e.g., Abril, supra note 19 at 79 (discussing expectations of privacy 
in traditional tort law). 
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
11 O. This is evidenced by a LexisN exis search, returning only 21 results from 
a search of federal and state cases combined with the terms intrusion 
w/2 seclusion AND ("social network" OR Facebook OR Twitter OR 
Google). Of these results, only one case is relevant: Maremont v. Susan 
Fredman Design Group, Ltd., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
140446, *21 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011), (dismissing claim for intrusion upon 
seclusion on basis of information shared on Facebook and Twitter being 
"not private"). 
111. Fact Sheet, supra note 18 (detailing Facebook's on.line operation model). 
112. Fact Sheet, FACEBOOK (Oct. 9, 2011, 3:14 PM), 
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?factsheet (Facebook's self-
identified purpose is to "facilitate the sharing of information through the 
social graph, the digital mapping of people's real-world social 
connections. Anyone can sign up for Facebook and interact with the 
people they know in a trusted environment."). 
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is a rapidly evolving area that implicates PHI protections.114 
Traditional causes of action based in concepts of physical space fail to 
protect this highly valued category of information.115 
The second reason these traditional causes of action apply 
imperfectly to social networking is that they are retrospective privacy 
protections. Adherence to retrospective measures ignores the reality 
that they provide little actual remedy for harms based on disclosure 
of information online. The traditional common law causes of action 
fall short because they are retrospective, thus, providing protection 
only in the form of causes of action arising after privacy is invaded.116 
Defamation provides an example of retrospective protection.117 A 
suit for defamation is a poor response to the actual harm that results 
when such statements are posted online. As illustrated in in Proto v. 
Hamic. 118 the defendant posted many negative remarks about his 
former teacher on Facebook and Twitter.119 Information posted online 
can have a disturbing permanence.120 Not only do sites limit users' 
abilities to delete information, 121 but it may also be impossible to 
trace where the information has spread.122 Even if th~ teacher 
prevailed and the student removed the posting, the comments could 
have already spread beyond that site and may cause . continual 
damage to the teacher's reputation. 
113. Id. 
114. See infra Part III. 
115. There has been an increased emphasis on moving away from "physical-
space-based" privacy torts to better reflect the reality of privacy in the 
social networking arena. See, e.g., Abril, supra note 19; Kiggins, supra 
note 19; and Terry, supra note 76. 
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (examples include 
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false light 
privacy). 
117. Id. ("A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with 
him."). 
118. See supra Part II.B.1; Proto, supra note 18, at *1-2. 
119. Proto, supra note 18, at *1-2 
120. See supra note 5, 
121. Id. 
122. Georgina Pradhan, Analysis: New EU Data Laws Command the Tide 
But Not the Cost, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2012, 1:02 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/24/us-europe-data-legislation-
idUSTRE80Ml VL20120124 (discussing likely difficulty of enforcement of 
new E.U. data-protection proposals due in part to inability to trace and 
totally remove contested information). 
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with regard to physical space, 105 which is largely incompatible with an 
online setting. Second, these causes of action are retrospective rather 
than preventative.106 
First, the focus on physical space does not comport with the 
online medium. Traditionally, privacy has focused on control of 
physical space.107 Privacy could be attained through an individual's 
ability to control access to his physical space or to control the 
distribution of information about himself within that space. 108 The 
tort of Intrusion upon Seclusion epitomizes the traditional focus on 
physical space in privacy protection. An actor is liable for invasion of 
privacy when he "intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon 
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns . 
. . if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. "109 
While the definition provides that the intrusion could be a physical 
intrusion or "otherwise," courts have not expanded this concept 
beyond its traditional basis in physical space.110 
This physical space framework is a poor fit for social networking. 
Online social networking is conducted in cyberspace; a virtual world 
that does not fit within the physical bounds that this cause of action 
envisions. 111 In addition, social networking is predicated on sharing 
information, 112 which is antithetical to seclusion.113 Social networking 
105. See Abril, supra note 19, at 79-80 (discussing how a plaintiff would need 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a physical area to bring an action 
under traditional tort laws); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 652 (1977). 
106. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (defining 
"defamatory communication" and discussing how the communication 
must have actually been made). 
107. See supra notes 19-20. 
108. See, e.g., Abril, supra note 19 at 79 (discussing expectations of privacy 
in traditional tort law). 
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 652B (1977). 
110. This is evidenced by a LexisNexis search, returning only 21 results from 
a search of federal and state cases combined with the terms intrusion 
w/2 seclusion AND {"social network" OR Facebook OR Twitter OR 
Google). Of these results, only one case is relevant: Maremont v. Susan 
Fredman Design Group, Ltd., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
140446, *21 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011), (dismissing claim for intrusion upon 
seclusion on basis of information shared on Facebook and Twitter being 
"not private"). 
111. Fact Sheet, supra note 18 (detailing Facebook's online operation model). 
112. Fact Sheet, FACEBOOK (Oct. 9, 2011, 3:14 PM), 
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?factsheet (Facebook's self-
identified purpose is to "facilitate the sharing of information through the 
social graph, the digital mapping of people's real-world social 
connections. Anyone can sign up for Facebook and interact with the 
people they know in a trusted environment."). 
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is a rapidly evolving area that implicates PHI protections.114 
Traditional causes of action based in concepts of physical space fail to 
protect this highly valued category of information.115 
The second reason these traditional causes of action apply 
imperfectly to social networking is that they are retrospective privacy 
protections. Adherence to retrospective measures ignores the reality 
that they provide little actual remedy for harms based on disclosure 
of information online. The traditional common law causes of action 
fall short because they are retrospective, thus, providing protection 
only in the form of causes of action arising after privacy is invaded.116 
Defamation provides an example of retrospective protection. 117 A 
suit for defamation is a poor response to the actual harm that results 
when such statements are posted online. As illustrated in in Proto v. 
Hamic.118 the defendant posted many negative remarks about his 
former teacher on Facebook and Twitter.119 Information posted online 
can have a disturbing permanence.120 Not only do sites limit users' 
abilities to delete information, 121 but it may also be impossible to 
trace where the information has spread.122 Even if the. teacher 
prevailed and the student removed the posting, the comments could 
have already spread beyond that site and may cause . continual 
damage to the teacher's reputation. 
113. Id. 
114. See infra Part III. 
115. There has been an increased emphasis on moving away from "physical-
space-based" privacy torts to better reflect the reality of privacy in the 
social networking arena. See, e.g., Abril, supra note 19; Kiggins, supra 
note 19; and Terry, supra note 76. 
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (examples include 
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false light 
privacy). 
117. Id. ("A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with 
him."). 
118. See supra Part II.B.1; Proto, supra note 18, at *1-2. 
119. Proto, supra note 18, at *1-2 
120. See supra note 5, 
121. Id. 
122. Georgina Pradhan, Analysis: New EU Data Laws Command the Tide 
But Not the Cost, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2012, 1:02 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/24/us-europe-data-legislation-
idUSTRE80Ml VL20120124 (discussing likely difficulty of enforcement of 
new E.U. data-protection proposals due in part to inability to trace and 
totally remove contested information). 
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Retrospective causes of action provide little if any protection 
before the inflicted harm in the social networking context. Despite a 
potential deterrent effect, these causes of action do not effectively 
respond once information has been posted, nor do they prevent all 
postings. There is relatively little case law on the subject, i23 which 
results in a lack of guidance for users and sites alike. With the 
potential for unwanted and unwarranted disclosure of information 
that brings with it an inability to delete the data,i24 PHI protection 
becomes a paramount concern. The spread of information as personal 
and valued as health information can cause particular harm. i25 If PHI 
is disclosed beyond its intended audience, the harm could include 
embarrassment, damage to relationships, and the impugning of 
reputations-the kinds of wrongs not easily remedied, if at all, and 
even less so in retrospect. i26 Once harmful information is disclosed 
online, it is difficult to trace its spread, and nearly impossible to 
remove. i27 To wait until the damage is done may result in no remedy 
at all. 
Ill. PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION SHARED THROUGH 
SOCIAL NETWORKING DESERVES PROTECTIONS 
American society values protecting privacy through control over 
personal information and, specifically, control over PHI.128 However, 
this value is being challenged by the swift evolution of social 
networking. This area raises challenges in new and unfamiliar ways. 
Preservation of this value will require significant attention fo this 
rapid evolution, and protection should be extended to PHI on social 
networking sites for two reasons. First, extending protections to PHI 
shared in social networking would respect realities ignored by current 
law. Second, without protections, the disconnect between expected 
and actual privacy will harm users through unanticipated PHI 
disclosures. 
123. For examples of case law on point, see, e.g.,Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 
No. C 10-5282 RS, 2011 WL 5117164 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011); Fraley 
v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F.Supp.2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
124. See supra note 5. 
125. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464 ("Among different 
sorts of personal information, health information is among the most 
sensitive."). 
126. See id.at 82,465 ("[M]alicious or inquisitive persons may download 
medical records for purposes ranging from identity theft to 
embarrassment to prurient interest in the life of a celebrity or 
neighbor."). 
127. See supra note 5; and Pradhan, supra note 122. 
128. See supra Part I. 
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A. Social Networking Realities 
The swift evolution of social networking has produced four 
realities. First, social networking is on the rise. i29 Second social 
t ki . 1 bl i 3o Th d ' ne wor ng is va ua e. ir , users expect that they have control 
ov~r the .information they share. 131 Fourth, this expectation of 
privacy IS undermined by the sites' conflicting privacy 
representations. i32 
Soeial networking is on the rise. 133 Sites like Facebook 134 
Twitter, 135. a~d Google, 136 which have become ubiquitous, bo~st 
membership m the hundreds of millions. 137 Social networking has 
become a coIDIIlon method of interaction and shows no signs of 
b t• i38 0 . ~ a mg.. n~ po~s1ble way to address harms incurred by sharing 
mformat10n onlme is to warn a user against posting anything that 
us~r would not want shared with the world, a "just don't post it" 
ph1l~sophy: However, while controlling personal information by not 
postmg might be one way to fit into the current law this is 
unrealistic and ignores social networking's pervasiveness. ' 
129. See, e'.g., @Twitter, supra note 4 (detailing increases in Twitter users 
and accounts). 
130. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. 
131. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text. 
132. See infra notes 184-94 and accompanying text. 
133. 
134. 
135. 
136. 
See @Twitter, supra note 4 (detailing increases in Twitter users and 
accounts). 
See Monica Hesse, Status Symbol: Facebook Is Ubiquitous But Is It 
Really an Antisoc~al Network?, WASH. POST. (July 23, 2010),' 
http://www.washmgtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/ cont~nt/ art~cle/2010 /0! /22/ AR20100072206154.html (describing 
Face book s massive popularity and prevalence in modern society). 
T-WITTER: The Fastest Growing Social Platform, GLOBAL WEBINDEX, 
http://globalwebindex.net/wp-
c~~tent/uploads/downloa~s/2?13/0~/Twitter_GWI_2013.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2013) ( Twitter is now the fastest growing social 
pla~form increasing 403 between Q[uarter] 2 and Q[uarter] 4[,] 2012. 
This means there are now 485m[illion] account holders and 288 m[illion] 
active users."). 
Richard Siklos, Ubiquitious? Omniscient? It Must Be Google, 
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 2, 2003 12:01 A), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2867734/Ubiquitous-Omniscient-It-
must~be-Google.html (discussing Google and its history of privacy 
practices) . 
137. See Key Facts, supra note 3; and @Twitter, supra note 4. 
138. See @Twitter, supra note 4 (showing the number of Twitter users 
growing each year). 
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Retrospective causes of action provide little if any protection 
before the inflicted harm in the social networking context. Despite a 
potential deterrent effect, these causes of action do not effectively 
respond once information has been posted, nor do they prevent all 
postings. There is relatively little case law on the subject, 123 which 
results in a lack of guidance for users and sites alike. With the 
potential for unwanted and unwarranted disclosure of information 
that brings with it an inability to delete the data, 124 PHI protection 
becomes a paramount concern. The spread of information as personal 
and valued as health information can cause particular harm.125 If PHI 
is disclosed beyond its intended audience, the harm could include 
embarrassment, damage to relationships, and the impugning of 
reputations-the kinds of wro.ngs not easily remedied, if at all, and 
even less so in retrospect. 126 Once harmful information is disclosed 
online, it is difficult to trace its spread, and nearly impossible to 
remove.127 To wait until the damage is done may result in no remedy 
at all. 
Ill. PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION SHARED THROUGH 
SOCIAL NETWORKING DESERVES PROTECTIONS 
American society values protecting privacy through control over 
personal information and, specifically, control over PHI.128 However, 
this value is being challenged by the swift evolution of social 
networking. This area raises challenges in new and unfamiliar ways. 
Preservation of this value will require significant attention to this 
rapid evolution, and protection should be extended to PHI on social 
networking sites for two reasons. First, extending protections to PHI 
shared in social networking would respect realities ignored by current 
law. Second, without protections, the disconnect between expected 
and actual privacy will harm users through unanticipated PHI 
disclosures. 
123. For examples of case law on point, see, e.g.,Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 
No. C 10-5282 RS, 2011 WL 5117164 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011); Fraley 
v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F.Supp.2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
124. See supra note 5. 
125. 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 82,464 ("Among different 
sorts of personal information, health information is among the most 
sensitive."). 
126. See id.at 82,465 (" [M]alicious or inquisitive persons may download 
medical records for purposes ranging from identity theft to 
embarrassment to prurient interest in the life of a celebrity or 
neighbor."). 
127. See supra note 5; and Pradhan, supra note 122. 
128. See supra Part I. 
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A. Social Networking Realities 
The swift evolution of social networking has produced four 
realities. First, social networking is on the rise. 129 Second social 
networking is valuable. 130 Third, users expect that they have 'control 
ov~r the information they share. 131 Fourth, this expectation of 
privacy is undermined by the sites' conflicting privacy 
representations. 132 
Soeial networking is on the rise. 133 Sites like Facebook 134 
Twitter,135• a~d Google, 136 which have become ubiquitous, bo~st 
membership m the hundreds of millions. 137 Social networking has 
become a common method of interaction and shows no signs of 
b t" 138 0 . ~ a mg.. n~ po~sible way to address harms incurred by sharing 
mformation onlme is to warn a user against posting anything that 
us~r would not want shared with the world, a "just don't post it" 
phil~sophy: However, while controlling personal information by not 
postmg might be one way to fit into the current law this is 
unrealistic and ignores social networking's pervasiveness. ' 
129. See, e'.g., @Twitter, supra note 4 (detailing increases in Twitter users 
and accounts). 
130. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. 
131. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text. 
132. See infra notes 184-94 and accompanying text. 
133. 
134. 
135. 
136. 
See @Twitter, supra note 4 (detailing increases in Twitter users and 
accounts). . 
See Monica Hesse, Status Symbol: Facebook Is Ubiquitous But Is It 
Really an Antisoc~al Network?, WASH. POST. (July 23, 2010),' 
http://www.washmgtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/cont~nt/art~cle/2010/0! /22/ AR20100072206154.html (describing 
Facebook s massive popularity and prevalence in modern society). 
T·WITTER: The Fastest Growing Social Platform, GLOBAL WEBINDEX, 
http://globalwebindex.net/wp-
c~i:tent/uploads/ downloa~s/2?13 /0~/Twitter_ GWI_2013.pdf (last 
v1s1ted Mar. 2, 2013) ( Twitter is now the fastest growing social 
pla~form increasing 403 between Q[uarter] 2 and Q[uarter] 4[,] 2012. 
This means there are now 485m[illion] account holders and 288 m[illion] 
active users."). 
Richard Siklos, Ubiquitious? Omniscient? It Must Be Google, 
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 2, 2003 12:01 A), 
http://www.telegraph.co. uk/ finance /2867734/Ubiquitous-Omniscient-It-
must~ be-Google.html (discussing Google and its history of privacy 
practices) . 
137. See Key Facts, supra note 3; and @Twitter, supra note 4. 
138. See @Twitter, supra note 4 (showing the number of Twitter users 
growing each year). 
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Second, social networking is valuable. In today's internet-based 
society, social networking sites serve important roles-creating 
opportunities for building identity, dignity, and intimacy.139 Social 
networking has also expanded beyond the social capacity, becoming a 
tool for business, marketing, news, and politics.140 This trend 
continues to escalate, and accordingly, social media will likely 
continue to permeate interpersonal interactions. 
Third, users expect that they have control over the information 
they share.141 While there are disagreements over whether privacy 
can actually exist in the context of social networking interactions, 142 
those who participate in social networks experience real feelings of 
protectiveness of their online "space" and the information they share 
in that space.143 These feelings are supported by the sites' reassuring 
privacy jargon.144 Sites market themselves as providing an 
opportunity to share personal information and develop personal 
relationships in a "trusted environment. "145 For example, Google 
recently launched a promotion for its Google+ platform, which 
includes "Circles. "146 Google promoted this feature as "sharing but like 
139. Abril, supra note 19, at 83-87 (detailing four primary reasons for 
increasing online privacy protection: the promotion of identity; dignity; 
intimacy and socialization; and discourse). 
140. Facebook Public Policy Europe, Measuring Facebook's Economic 
Impact in Europe, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Jan. 24, 2012), 
http://newsroom.fb.com/Whats-New-Home-Page/Measuring-Facebook-
s-economic-impact-in-Europe-ae.aspx ("Citizens can now speak directly 
to their leaders, new political movements are born online, and a single 
voice can reach an audience of millions."). See also, @Twitter, supra 
note 4; Tweet, tweet! Using Twitter to Build Career Connections Now, 
supra note 6, at 8; Dysart, supra note 6, at 32. 
141. See, e.g., Levin & Abril, supra note 30 (demonstrating findings of an 
empirical study showing that users have expectations of privacy over 
what they share via social media). 
142. Abril, supra note 19, at 73 ("[S]ome subscribe to the notion that online 
privacy is non-existent and its protection, whether legal or practical, is 
therefore futile."). 
143. Id. (citing users' "feeling[s] of intrusion when their online personae are 
discovered by ... unintended audiences"). 
144. See, e.g., Facebook Reveals 'Simplified' Privacy Changes, supra note 3 
(praising increased privacy settings options but criticizing overlooking 
sale of personal data to advertisers); and Bankston, supra note 3 
(criticizing new Face book privacy changes as "clearly intended to push 
Facebook users to publicly share even more information than before" 
and reducing user control over "personal data") (emphasis in original). 
145. See Fact Sheet, supra note 112 (discussing how Facebook advertises its 
service as being able to interact with friends in a trusted environment). 
146. See Google, supra note 8. 
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real life, "147 purporting to allow users to selectively share information 
with only certain contacts, just as they would divide their social 
groups offline. 148 This approach equates cyberspace to real space, 
creating a feeling of security akin to sitting in a virtual living room 
talking to a set group of friends. 149 This sense of security in online 
sharing renders users vulnerable to unintended disclosures of 
information, especially when these very public advertisements are only 
part of the reality. 150 
Fourth, despite this emphasis on control and privacy, the reality 
is that much privacy control is subject to the sites' discretion. 151 For 
example, in addition to its "Circles" promotions, 152 Google has 
recently begun to alert users to impending changes in its privacy 
policy. 153 These changes include an increase in the information that is 
connected across various platforms154-without users' consent155 or 
147. Id. ("Sharing but like real life." quote appears at time code 1:21). 
148. Id. 
149. See Harvest Zhang, Google+ and Circles: Why Keeping Social Groups 
Separate Is Highly Necessary and Why Facebook's Retaliatory "Friends 
Lists" Fail, NETWORK20Q ELE 281 CLASS BLOG (Sept. 20, 2011, 3:16 
PM), http://scenic.princeton.edu/network20q/blog/?p=61 (for an 
example of this perception). 
150. See, e.g., Miguel Helli, Facebook Acknowledges Privacy Issue with 
Applications, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2010 11:58 AM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/facebook-admits-to-privacy-
issue-and-makes-fixes/ (describing public response to Facebook giving 
users' personal information to advertisers and other third parties). 
151. See supra note 5. See also One Policy, One Google Experience, GOOGLE 
POLICIES & PRINCIPLES, http://www.google.com/intljen/policies/ (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2012) (explaining the upcoming compulsory change to 
privacy policy and terms of use). 
152. See Helft, supra note 150. 
153. Tim Carmody, Google Streamlines Privacy Policy to Integrate Its 
Products, WIRED (Jan. 24, 2012, 6:16 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/business/2012/01/google-streamlines-privacy / 
(discussing Google's new integrated privacy policy and corresponding 
privacy alert system). 
154. Tom McCarthy, Google's New 'Tailored' Privacy Policy: How to 
Circumvent the Rules, GUARDIAN, (Feb. 29, 2012, 3:18 PM EST), 
http:/ /www.guardian.co.uk/technology /us-news-
blog/2012/feb/29 /google-privacy-policy-tips-and-tricks (When users are 
signed in to Google, the new policy will permit Google to "do things like 
suggest search queries - or tailor your search results - based on the 
interests you've expressed [in Google+, Gmail, and YouTube.]"). 
155, Mat Honan, Google's Broken Promise: The End of "Don't Be Evil", 
GIZMODO (Jan. 24, 2012, 5:41 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5878987 /its-
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Second, social networking is valuable. In today's internet-based 
society, social networking sites serve important roles-creating 
opportunities for building identity, dignity, and intimacy.139 Social 
networking has also expanded beyond the social capacity, becoming a 
tool for business, marketing, news, and politics.140 This trend 
continues to escalate, and accordingly, social media will likely 
continue to permeate interpersonal interactions. 
Third, users expect that they have control over the information 
they share.141 While there are disagreements over whether privacy 
can actually exist in the context of social networking interactions,142 
those who participate in social networks experience real feelings of 
protectiveness of their online "space" and the information they share 
in that space.143 These feelings are supported by the sites' reassuring 
privacy jargon.144 Sites market themselves as providing an 
opportunity to share personal information and develop personal 
relationships in a "trusted environment. "145 For example, Google 
recently launched a promotion for its Google+ platform, which 
includes "Circles. "146 Google promoted this feature as "sharing but like 
139. Abril, supra note 19, at 83-87 (detailing four primary reasons for 
increasing online privacy protection: the promotion of identity; dignity; 
intimacy and socialization; and discourse). 
140. Facebook Public Policy Europe, Measuring Facebook's Economic 
Impact in Europe, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Jan. 24, 2012), 
http://newsroom.fb.com/Whats-New-Home-Page/Measuring-Facebook-
s-economic-impact-in-Europe-ae.aspx ("Citizens can now speak directly 
to their leaders, new political movements are born online, and a single 
voice can reach an audience of millions."). See also, @Twitter, supra 
note 4; Tweet, tweet! Using Twitter to Build Career Connections Now, 
supra note 6, at 8; Dysart, supra note 6, at 32. 
141. See, e.g., Levin & Abril, supra note 30 (demonstrating findings of an 
empirical study showing that users have expectations of privacy over 
what they share via social media). 
142. Abril, supra note 19, at 73 ("[S]ome subscribe to the notion that online 
privacy is non-existent and its protection, whether legal or practical, is 
therefore futile."). 
143. Id. (citing users' "feeling[s] of intrusion when their online personae are 
discovered by ... unintended audiences"). 
144. See, e.g., Facebook Reveals 'Simplified' Privacy Changes, supra note 3 
(praising increased privacy settings options but criticizing overlooking 
sale of personal data to advertisers); and Bankston, supra note 3 
(criticizing new Face book privacy changes as "clearly intended to push 
Facebook users to publicly share even more information than before" 
and reducing user control over "personal data") (emphasis in original). 
145. See Fact Sheet, supra note 112 (discussing how Facebook advertises its 
service as being able to interact with friends in a trusted environment). 
146. See Google, supra note 8. 
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real life, "147 purporting to allow users to selectively share information 
with only certain contacts, just as they would divide their social 
groups offline. 148 This approach equates cyberspace to real space, 
creating a feeling of security akin to sitting in a virtual living room 
talking to a set group of friends. 149 This sense of security in online 
sharing renders users vulnerable to unintended disclosures of 
information, especially when these very public advertisements are only 
part of the reality. 150 
Fourth, despite this emphasis on control and privacy, the reality 
is that much privacy control is subject to the sites' discretion. 151 For 
example, in addition to its "Circles" promotions, 152 Google has 
recently begun to alert users to impending changes in its privacy 
policy. 153 These changes include an increase in the information that is 
connected across various platforms154-without users' consent155 or 
147. Id. ("Sharing but like real life." quote appears at time code 1:21). 
148. Id. 
149. See Harvest Zhang, Google+ and Circles: Why Keeping Social Groups 
Separate Is Highly Necessary and Why Facebook's Retaliatory "Friends 
Lists" Fail, NETWORK20Q ELE 281 CLASS BLOG (Sept. 20, 2011, 3:16 
PM), http://scenic.princeton.edu/network20q/blog/?p=61 (for an 
example of this perception). 
150. See, e.g., Miguel Helft, Facebook Acknowledges Privacy Issue with 
Applications, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2010 11:58 AM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/facebook-admits-to-privacy-
issue-and-makes-fixes/ (describing public response to Facebook giving 
users' personal information to advertisers and other third parties). 
151. See supra note 5. See also One Policy, One Google Experience, GOOGLE 
POLICIES & PRINCIPLES, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/ (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2012) (explaining the upcoming compulsory change to 
privacy policy and terms of use). 
152. See Helft, supra note 150. 
153. Tim Carmody, Google Streamlines Privacy Policy to Integrate Its 
Products, WIRED (Jan. 24, 2012, 6:16 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/business/2012/01/google-streamlines-privacy / 
(discussing Google's new integrated privacy policy and corresponding 
privacy alert system). 
154. Tom McCarthy, Google's New 'Tailored' Privacy Policy: How to 
Circumvent the Rules, GUARDIAN, (Feb. 29, 2012, 3:18 PM EST), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology /us-news-
blog/2012/feb/29/google-privacy-policy-tips-and-tricks (When users are 
signed in to Google, the new policy will permit Google to "do things like 
suggest search queries - or tailor your search results - based on the 
interests you've expressed [in Google+, Gmail, and YouTube.]"). 
155, Mat Honan, Google's Broken Promise: The End of "Don't Be Evil", 
GIZMODO (Jan. 24, 2012, 5:41 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5878987 /its-
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ability to opt-out. 156 Obtuse and convoluted policies make it more 
difficult to determine the level of control individuals retain over 
privacy settings and other users' access to their information. Not 
only are these policies dominated by legal terminology and difficult to 
understand, but scholars have also suggested that most users do not 
read them, 157 and, if they did, the opportunities cost for reading these 
policies would approximate $780 billion annually for American users 
alone.158 
B. The Privacy Disconnect and Resulting Harms to Users 
The disconnect between users' expectations of control of 
information in social networking settings and the reality of its limits 
are likely to result in a myriad of harms to users. Three examples 
provide a sampling of these potential harms. 
First, consider the storage of information on social networking 
sites. Urban legend-backed by truth-tells that nothing can ever 
truly be deleted from users' online personas.159 Facebook itself 
cautions users of this fact, noting, "Even after you remove 
information from your profile or delete your account, copies of that 
information may remain viewable elsewhere. "160 An individual could 
attempt to take control of his information by removing it from a 
social networking site, only to be frustrated by a programmed 
inability to achieve that goal. 
156. 
157. 
158. 
official-google-is-evil-nowid. ("If you use Google's services, you have to 
agree to this new privacy policy."). 
For the purposes of this note, "opt out" means zero-participation in or 
consent to the Google privacy policy. Google does assert that there are 
methods to "opt out" for certain mobile devices. See Anonymous 
Identifiers on Mobile Devices, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
policies/technologies/ads/ (last visited. Mar. 3, 2013). 
Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading 
Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J .L. & Pol'y for Info. Soc'y 543, 564-67 (~008-
09) (discussing the costs associated with taking the time to read pnvacy 
policies). 
Id. (advocating that an online privacy system requiring users to read 
lengthy and complex privacy policies to preserve their rights is too 
costly, and that companies should find ways to convey privacy practices 
"in useable ways, which includes reducing the time it takes to read 
policies"). 
159. For an illustrative example, see Internet Archive, The Wayback 
Machine, ARCHIVE.ORG, http://archive.org/web/web.php (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2013) (the "Wayback Machine" is an internet archive cataloging 
over 2 billion webpages). 
160. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. 
LEXIS 270, 6-7 (Pa. Cnty. Ct. 2010) (citing . Facebook, 
http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (revised April 22, 2010)). 
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Next, consider changing privacy policies that result in disclosure 
beyond what the individual intended. Social networking sites' well-
documented and contentious practice of changing their privacy 
settings seemingly overnight is just another of the potential snares for 
social networking users. 161 These changes are often implemented 
without significant warning or user input, and often go into effect 
before users are aware of them. 162 Google's recent privacy changes 
provide an example. 163 Users have the benefit of advanced notice in 
this instance, but lack the ability to opt-out of the increased cross-
platform sharing of information.164 Many sites have not afforded users 
the same level of alerts before a change in policies.165 For example, 
Facebook has a history of changing privacy settings in such a way as 
to render privately held information public.166 
Privacy setting changes of this nature can mean that an 
individual user may· have taken all the available protective steps, but 
still have their personal information disclosed beyond their intended 
audience. While the recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
settlements address these issues retrospectively,167 the threat of future 
disclosures from social networking sites remains. Although the 
settlement agreements place stringent privacy requirements on 
Facebook and Google for the next twenty years, these requirements 
161. Discontent with such practices has seen discussion for several years. See 
supra note 149 Meanwhile, there has been no resolution until the recent 
settlement agreement with the F.T.C. See Protalinski, supra note 3 
(discussion the settlement). 
162. See, e.g., Low v. Linkedin Corp., 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2012 WL 2873847 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) ("As noted by Defendant, although the Amended 
Complaint describes the terms of Defendant's privacy policy in detail, 
Plaintiffs never allege that they were aware of the privacy policy, let 
alone saw or read it."). 
163. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (July 27, 2012), http://www.google.com/ 
policies/ privacy/. 
164. Id. (noting failure to provide a means for opting-out of information 
sharing). 
165. See, e.g., McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 96 (W.D.Pa. 2010) 
(discussing implications of website privacy policy); see also FTC Gives 
Final Approval to Settlement with Google over Buzz Rollout, FEDERAL 
TRADE COMM'N (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/10/ 
buzz.shtm (noting that even Google did not provide such alerts to its 
users before rolling out its social networking feature, Buzz, in 2010, 
providing the impetus for the charges and recent settlement with the 
F.T.C). 
166. Cf. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc . .i 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (determining whether [plaintiff's] privacy settings rendered 
[his] wall postings and comments public). 
167. See Protalinski, supra note 3 (discussing the settlement). 
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ability to opt-out. 156 Obtuse and convoluted policies make it more 
difficult to determine the level of control individuals retain over 
privacy settings and other users' access to their information. Not 
only are these policies dominated by legal terminology and difficult to 
understand, but scholars have also suggested that most users do not 
read them, 157 and, if they did, the opportunities cost for reading these 
policies would approximate $780 billion annually for American users 
alone.158 
B. The Privacy Disconnect and Resulting Harms to Users 
The disconnect between users' expectations of control of 
information in social networking settings and the reality of its limits 
are likely to result in a myriad of harms to users. Three examples 
provide a sampling of these potential harms. 
First, consider the storage of information on social networking 
sites. Urban legend-backed by truth-tells that nothing can ever 
truly be deleted from users' online personas.159 Facebook itself 
cautions users of this fact, noting, "Even after you remove 
information from your profile or delete your account, copies of that 
information may remain viewable elsewhere."160 An individual could 
attempt to take control of his information by removing it from a 
social networking site, only to be frustrated by a programmed 
inability to achieve that goal. 
156. 
157. 
158. 
official-google-is-evil-nowid. ("If you use Google's services, you have to 
agree to this new privacy policy."). 
For the purposes of this note, "opt out" means zero-participation in or 
consent to the Google privacy policy. Google does assert that there are 
methods to "opt out" for certain mobile devices. See Anonymous 
Identifiers on Mobile Devices, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
policies/technologies/ads/ (last visited. Mar. 3, 2013). 
Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading 
Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & Pol'y for Info. Soc'y 543, 564-67 (~008-
09) (discussing the costs associated with taking the time to read privacy 
policies). 
Id. (advocating that an online privacy system requirin~ u~ers t~ read 
lengthy and complex privacy policies to preserve their. rights lS .too 
costly, and that companies should find ways to convey privacy practices 
"in useable ways, which includes reducing the time it takes to read 
policies"). 
159. For an illustrative example, see Internet Archive, The Wayback 
Machine, ARCHIVE.ORG, http://archive.org/web/web.php (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2013) (the "Wayback Machine" is an internet archive cataloging 
over 2 billion webpages). 
160. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. 
LEXIS 270, 6-7 (Pa. Cnty. Ct. 2010) (citing . Facebook, 
http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (revised April 22, 2010)). 
432 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Personal Health Information Shared Via Social Networking 
Next, consider changing privacy policies that result in disclosure 
beyond what the individual intended. Social networking sites' well-
documented and contentious practice of changing their privacy 
settings seemingly overnight is just another of the potential snares for 
social networking users. 161 These changes are often implemented 
without significant warning or user input, and often go into effect 
before users are aware of them. 162 Google's recent privacy changes 
provide an example. 163 Users have the benefit of advanced notice in 
this instance, but lack the ability to opt-out of the increased cross-
platform sharing of information.164 Many sites have not afforded users 
the same level of alerts before a change in policies.165 For example, 
Facebook has a history of changing privacy settings in such a way as 
to render privately held information public.166 
Privacy setting changes of this nature can mean that an 
individual user may· have taken all the available protective steps, but 
still have their personal information disclosed beyond their intended 
audience. While the recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
settlements address these issues retrospectively, 167 the threat of future 
disclosures from social networking sites remains. Although the 
settlement agreements place stringent privacy requirements on 
Facebook and Google for the next twenty years, these requirements 
161. Discontent with such practices has seen discussion for several years. See 
supra note 149 Meanwhile, there has been no resolution until the recent 
settlement agreement with the F.T.C. See Protalinski, supra note 3 
(discussion the settlement). 
162. See, e.g., Low v. Linkedln Corp., 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2012 WL 2873847 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) ("As noted by Defendant, although the Amended 
Complaint describes the terms of Defendant's privacy policy in detail, 
Plaintiffs never allege that they were aware of the privacy policy, let 
alone saw or read it."). 
163. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (July 27, 2012), http://www.google.com/ 
policies/privacy/. 
164. Id. (noting failure to provide a means for opting-out of information 
sharing). 
165. See, e.g., McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 96 (W.D.Pa. 2010) 
(discussing implications of website privacy policy); see also FTC Gives 
Final Approval to Settlement with Google over Buzz Rollout, FEDERAL 
TRADE COMM'N (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/10/ 
buzz.shtm (noting that even Google did not provide such alerts to its 
users before rolling out its social networking feature, Buzz, in 2010, 
providing the impetus for the charges and recent settlement with the 
F.T.C). 
166. Cf. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (determining whether [plaintiff's] privacy settings rendered 
[his] wall postings and comments public). 
167. See Protalinski, supra note 3 (discussing the settlement). 
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are based on harms from site components that are, in several 
instances, already obsolete.168 This rapid change further illustrates 
the need for protections based on categories of information and not on 
specific technological practices. 
Fourth, consider the sale of information to third party sites, a 
practice that has been going on behind the scenes for years. 169 Sites 
have advertised privacy controls to users while selling or otherwise 
distributing information outside the realm of the social networking 
site.170 This practice results in personal information being spread far 
beyond users' expectations or awareness. 
From the control-as-privacy perspective, the storage, compromise, 
and sale of information in social networking give cause for concern. 
In the future, what will social networking sites do with stored 
information? What if the site is compromised or sold? What if a user 
takes all available precautions, or sends information in a private 
message, and the information is still compromised? 
Current law does not provide a satisfactory answer to these 
potential problems. The fact remains that information spread 
through online social networking can reach beyond the intended 
audience.171 Ignoring the hazards the online world poses will not 
protect individuals, their privacy, or their PHI; these threats must be 
confronted. The recent FTC settlements with Facebook and Google 
validate both the reality of these harms and the legitimacy of the 
users' interests. 172 Courts and legislatures, however, have not kept 
pace with these expectations,173 and retrospective solutions such as the 
FTC settlements offer insufficient protection.174 Bridging this gap will 
168. Id. 
169. See supra note 149. 
170. See supra note 149. 
171. For example, the capacity to "retweet" information can send a post 
viral. See Dan Zarrella, The Science of ReTweets, MASHABLE (Feb. 17, 
2009), http://mashable.com/2009/02/17 /twitter-retweets/ (analyzing 
how Twitter posts go viral). 
172. See Protalinski, supra note 3 (discussing the settlement). See also In 
the Matter of Google, Inc., Federal Trade Comm'n, File No. 102 3136, 
available athttp://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/ 
110330googlebuzzagreeorder. pdf. 
173. See, e.g., McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., 2010 Pa. Dist. & 
Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270 (Pa. Cnty. Ct. 2010) ("The relationships to be 
fostered through those media are basic friendships, not attorney-client, 
physician-patient, or psychologist-patient types of relationships, and 
while one may expect that his friend will hold certain information in 
confidence, the maintenance of one's friendships typically does not 
depend on confidentiality."). 
17 4. See Protalinski, supra note 3 (discussing the settlement). 
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require more than retrospective causes of action based on the 
antiquated constraints of physical space and applied to artificial 
boundaries-it will require a national solution in the form of 
preventative federal regulations that can adapt to the current and 
developing problems of protecting PHI in social networking. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
Americans value protection of privacy. 175 Americans also value 
preserving individual control over PHI.176 Social networking is 
ubiquitous and is here to stay.177 This three-way confluence of privacy 
values, PHI protection, and expansion of social networking is an 
intersection in which problems will develop if not given proper 
attention.178 While online social networking has positive aspects,179 its 
potential dangers should be addressed preemptively. With the lack of 
meaningful protections from current federal regulations and state 
laws, 180 there is a strong need for forward-thinking, preventative 
measures to protect this highly valued, vulnerable category of 
information. This Part first discusses how a comprehensive set of 
federal regulations could fill this need. Next, it outlines the 
advantages of this regulatory solution. 
A. Proposed Regulations 
To more effectively protect personal health information shared in 
online social networking settings, HHS should build on the "floor" 
described in the HIP AA Privacy Rule and promulgate additional 
federal regulations.181 In designing these regulations, HHS should allow 
individuals to retain a right of control over their personal health 
information by virtue of the character of the information itself. 
One of the arguments against federal regulations for privacy 
protection of information shared in social networking is that this 
industry's vast scope would make the regulations impossible to 
enforce and therefore render them powerless.182 A similar criticism 
175. See supra Part I. 
176. See supra Part I. 
177. See supra Part III.A. 
178. See supra Part III. 
179. See supra Part III.A. 
180. See supra Part IL 
181. Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182 ("[T]he 
Privacy Rule creates, for the first time, a floor of national protections 
for the privacy of [consumers'] most sensitive information-health 
information."). 
182. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 76. See also Gilman & Cooper, supra note 
24. 
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are based on harms from site components that are, in several 
instances, already obsolete. 168 This rapid change further illustrates 
. the need for protections based on categories of information and not on 
specific technological practices. 
Fourth, consider the sale of information to third party sites, a 
practice that has been going on behind the scenes for years. 169 Sites 
have advertised privacy controls to users while selling or otherwise 
distributing information outside the realm of the social networking 
site.170 This practice results in personal information being spread far 
beyond users' expectations or awareness. 
From the control-as-privacy perspective, the storage, compromise, 
and sale of information in social networking give cause for concern. 
In the future, what will social networking sites do with stored 
information? What if the site is compromised or sold? What if a user 
takes all available precautions, or sends information in a private 
message, and the information is still compromised? 
Current law does not provide a satisfactory answer to these 
potential problems. The fact remains that information spread 
through online social networking can reach beyond the intended 
audience. 171 Ignoring the hazards the online world poses will not 
protect individuals, their privacy, or their PHI; these threats must be 
confronted. The recent FTC settlements with Facebook and Google 
validate both the reality of these harms and the legitimacy of the 
users' interests. 172 Courts and legislatures, however, have not kept 
pace with these expectations,173 and retrospective solutions such as the 
FTC settlements offer insufficient protection.174 Bridging this gap will 
168. Id. 
169. See supra note 149. 
170. See supra note 149. 
171. For example, the capacity to "retweet" information can send a post 
viral. See Dan Zarrella, The Science of ReTweets, MASHABLE (Feb. 17, 
2009), http://mashable.com/2009/02/17 /twitter-retweets/ (analyzing 
how Twitter posts go viral). 
172. See Protalinski, supra note 3 (discussing the settlement). See also In 
the Matter of Google, Inc., Federal Trade Comm'n, File No. 102 3136, 
available athttp://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/ 
110330googlebuzzagreeorder. pdf. 
173. See, e.g., McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., 2010 Pa. Dist. & 
Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270 (Pa. Cnty. Ct. 2010) ("The relationships to be 
fostered through those media are basic friendships, not attorney-client, 
physician-patient, or psychologist-patient types of relationships, and 
while one may expect that his friend will hold certain information in 
confidence, the maintenance of one's friendships typically does not 
depend on confidentiality."). 
174. See Protalinski, supra note 3 (discussing the settlement). 
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require more than retrospective causes of action based on the 
antiquated constraints of physical space and applied to artificial 
boundaries-it will require a national solution in the form of 
preventative federal regulations that can adapt to the current and 
developing problems of protecting PHI in social networking. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
Americans value protection of privacy.175 Americans also value 
preserving individual control over PHI.176 Social networking is 
ubiquitous and is here to stay. 177 This three-way confluence of privacy 
values, PHI protection, and expansion of social networking is an 
intersection in which problems will develop if not given proper 
attention. 178 While online social networking has positive aspects,179 its 
potential dangers should be addressed preemptively. With the lack of 
meaningful protections from current federal regulations and state 
laws, 180 there is a strong need for forward-thinking, preventative 
measures to protect this highly valued, vulnerable category of 
information. This Part first discusses how a comprehensive set of 
federal regulations could fill this need. Next, it outlines the 
advantages of this regulatory solution. 
A. Proposed Regulations 
To more effectively protect personal health information shared in 
online social networking settings, HHS should build on the "floor" 
described in the HIP AA Privacy Rule and promulgate additional 
federal regulations. 181 In designing these regulations, HHS should allow 
individuals to retain a right of control over their personal health 
information by virtue of the character of the information itself. 
One of the arguments against federal regulations for privacy 
protection of information shared in social networking is that this 
industry's vast scope would make the regulations impossible to 
enforce and therefore render them powerless.182 A similar criticism 
175. See supra Part I. 
176. See supra Part I. 
177. See supra Part III.A. 
178. See supra Part III. 
179. See supra Part III.A. 
180. See supra Part II. 
181. Privacy Standards Modifications, supra note 40, at 53,182 ("[T]he 
Privacy Rule creates, for the first time, a floor of national protections 
for the privacy of [consumers'] most sensitive information-health 
information."). 
182. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 76. See also Gilman & Cooper, supra note 
24. 
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was advanced against the recently proposed data laws in the 
European Union, arguing the standards imposed would prove too 
difficult for compliance. 183 Accepting the premise that "it would be 
nearly impossible to trace all the places information may have spread 
after disclosure"184 underscores the need for preventative components 
to the proposed regulations. However, if the regulations were modeled 
on the value of protecting PHI based on its inherent characteristics, 
they would be able to regulate use of the information for broad 
categories of actors by providing guidance before inappropriate 
disclosure occurs. 
Because the regulations would address uses pertaining to PHI, 
HSS should bear the responsibility of drafting and promulgating the 
regulations. As the agency with the most experience handling issues 
related to PHI, 185 HHS is best equipped to draft informed, meaningful 
regulations in this area. The definition of PHI should be similar to 
that articulated under HIP AA. 186 PHI should be defined as any 
information that relates to the past, present, or future physical or 
mental health or condition of an individual. 187 This includes a wide 
range of information that could be identified through filters and 
screening processes by the sites. Examples include, but are not 
limited to, an individual posting about a physician appointment, the 
cold they had last week, a friend's surgery, or other health-related 
postings. As part of the regulations, HHS should establish 
administrative tribunals responsible for hearing complaints under 
these regulations. 
These regulations should employ a three-pronged approach. First, 
the regulations should require meaningful privacy disclosures and 
truthful advertising from social networking sites. Second, the 
regulations should provide guidelines for· the use of any PHI shared 
and collected on social networking sites. Third, the regulations 
should establish several courses of action and meaningful· remedies for 
183. See Pradhan, supra note 122 (discussing the likelihood that enforcing 
new E.U. data-protection proposals will be difficult, due in part to 
inability to trace and totally remove contested information). 
184. Id. 
185. HHS promulgated both the HIP AA Privacy Rule and the HITECH Act, 
both dealing with PHI. See 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 
82,462. See also HITECH, supra note 25. 
186. HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at § 160.103.("Health information 
means any information, whether oral or recorded in any form or 
medium, that . . . [r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or 
mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care 
to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the 
provision of health care to an individual."). 
187. See id. 
436 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET ·VOL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Personal Health Information Shared Via Social Networking 
both individual social networking users and for social networking 
sites. 
1. Meaningful Privacy Disclosures and Truthful Advertising 
The first prong of the regulations should require social networking 
sites to make meaningful, plain language privacy disclosures and to be 
truthful in how they advertise users' control over privacy and use of 
information. While there are many different ways this could be 
accomplished, this Note proposes four "first steps" toward achieving 
this goal. 
First, sites should be required to make their privacy policies more 
accessible to users. This could be accomplished by making the 
privacy policies easier to find and understand. The sites should be 
required to make the link to their privacy policies more prominent on 
the site. Users should not have to painstakingly search for the website 
privacy policy to find it. The policies should also be accessible in a 
meaningful, plain language way. While the importance of legal 
terminology in these policies cannot be overlooked, the privacy policy 
should be supplemented by a version that a layperson could easily 
read and understand. Access to the policies in plain language is 
necessary for users to make meaningful decisions regarding the 
protection of their PHI. This access should include notification-also 
in plain language-that alerts users to any pending changes in the 
privacy policy. 
Second, users should be required to complete a series of 
uncomplicated procedures before creating a profile. Initially, the user 
should have to undertake a comprehensive review of the privacy 
policy, rather than simply selecting a check box and clicking "I 
Accept." This could be accomplished in the form of a short plain-
language document that pops up, highlights, and then explains the 
site's privacy policy and terms of use. Following review of this 
document, users would be required to complete a short quiz; passing 
the quiz would demonstrate an adequate understanding of the ways 
the users' personal information will be used. Such a review ·and quiz 
process could also be required for each user on a regular basis, or each 
time the site changes its privacy policy or terms of use. A notice that 
policies are changing is of little utility if users do not read or fail to 
understand the policies. This tutorial should also be available to the 
users any time they desire a refresher on how the site is permitted to 
handle their information. 
Third, the sites should be required to undertake a similar process 
explaining and highlighting the user-controlled privacy settings of the 
site. Four requirements would help achieve this goal. First, sites 
should be required to make these explanations and settings 
transparent, meaningful, and user friendly. Second, sites should be 
required to make profiles' default setting private, not public. Third, 
the sites should not be permitted to change a user's privacy settings 
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was advanced against the recently proposed data laws in the 
European Union, arguing the standards imposed would prove too 
difficult for compliance.183 Accepting the premise that "it would be 
nearly impossible to trace all the places information may have spread 
after disclosure"184 underscores the need for preventative components 
to the proposed regulations. However, if the regulations were modeled 
on the value of protecting PHI based on its inherent characteristics, 
they would be able to regulate use of the information for broad 
categories of actors by providing guidance before inappropriate 
disclosure occurs. 
Because the regulations would address uses pertaining to PHI, 
HSS should bear the responsibility of drafting and promulgating the 
regulations. As the agency with the most experience handling issues 
related to PHI, 185 HHS is best equipped to draft informed, meaningful 
regulations in this area. The definition of PHI should be similar to 
that articulated under HIP AA. 186 PHI should be defined as any 
information that relates to the past, present, or future physical or 
mental health or condition of an individual. 187 This includes a wide 
range of information that could be identified through filters and 
screening processes by the sites. Examples include, but are not 
limited to, an individual posting about a physician appointment, the 
cold they had last week, a friend's surgery, or other health-related 
postings. As part of the regulations, HHS should establish 
administrative tribunals responsible for hearing complaints under 
these regulations. 
These regulations should employ a three-pronged approach. First, 
the regulations should require meaningful privacy disclosures and 
truthful advertising from social networking sites. Second, the 
regulations should provide guidelines for the use of any PHI shared 
and collected on social networking sites. Third, the regulations 
should establish several courses of action and meaningful· remedies for 
183. See Pradhan, supra note 122 (discussing the likelihood that enforcing 
new E.U. data-protection proposals will be difficult, due in part to 
inability to trace and totally remove contested information). 
184. Id. 
185. HHS promulgated both the HIP AA Privacy Rule and the HITECH Act, 
both dealing with PHI. See 2000 Privacy Standards, supra note 11, at 
82,462. See also HITECH, supra note 25. 
186. HIP AA Privacy Rule, supra note 25, at § 160.103.("Health information 
means any information, whether oral or recorded in any form or 
medium, that ... [r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or 
mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care 
to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the 
provision of health care to an individual."). 
187. See id. 
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both individual social networking users and for social networking 
sites. 
1. Meaningful Privacy Disclosures and Truthful Advertising 
The first prong of the regulations should require social networking 
sites to make meaningful, plain language privacy disclosures and to be 
truthful in how they advertise users' control over privacy and use of 
information. While there are many different ways this could be 
accomplished, this Note proposes four "first steps" toward achieving 
this goal. 
First, sites should be required to make their privacy policies more 
accessible to users. This could be accomplished by making the 
privacy policies easier to find and understand. The sites should be 
required to make the link to their privacy policies more prominent on 
the site. Users should not have to painstakingly search for the website 
privacy policy to find it. The policies should also be accessible in a 
meaningful, plain language way. While the importance of legal 
terminology in these policies cannot be overlooked, the privacy policy 
should be supplemented by a version that a layperson could easily 
read and understand. Access to the policies in plain language is 
necessary for users to make meaningful decisions regarding the 
protection of their PHI. This access should include notification-also 
in plain language-that alerts users to any pending changes in the 
privacy policy. 
Second, users should be required to complete a series of 
uncomplicated procedures before creating a profile. Initially, the user 
should have to undertake a comprehensive review of the privacy 
policy, rather than simply selecting a check box and clicking "I 
Accept." This could be accomplished in the form of a short plain-
language document that pops up, highlights, and then explains the 
site's privacy policy and terms of use. Following review of this 
document, users would be required to complete a short quiz; passing 
the quiz would demonstrate an adequate understanding of the ways 
the users' personal information will be used. Such a review and quiz 
process could also be required for each user on a regular basis, or each 
time the site changes its privacy policy or terms of use. A notice that 
policies are changing is of little utility if users do not read or fail to 
understand the policies. This tutorial should also be available to the 
users any time they desire a refresher on how the site is permitted to 
handle their information. 
Third, the sites should be required to undertake a similar process 
explaining and highlighting the user-controlled privacy settings of the 
site. Four requirements would help achieve this goal. First, sites 
should be required to make these explanations and settings 
transparent, meaningful, and user friendly. Second, sites should be 
required to make profiles' default setting private, not public. Third, 
the sites should not be permitted to change a user's privacy settings 
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without the user's affirmative authorization. In addition to the pop-
up privacy policy review, any change in user-controlled privacy 
settings should be subject to a similar walkthrough and would be at 
the user's discretion to accept or reject. Finally, sites should be 
required to give users the ability to flag or mark information as 
sensitive PHI that they do not want to be distributed, and the site 
should be required to review that information before proceeding with 
its use or distribution. 
The fourth initial step would require social networking sites to be 
truthful in their advertising. 188 Sites should have to issue a disclaimer 
that users should review the sites' privacy policies before posting 
information. Sites should also be prohibited from advertising 
misleading levels of control over privacy and information. Depending 
upon the advertisement medium, any advertisement should have to be 
accompanied by a plain-language . notice that is either visible or 
audible and in the same language as the predominance of the 
advertisement. A site's advertisement should not leave a user with an 
inaccurate understanding of the privacy or control their posts are 
afforded. 
2. Guidelines for Use of Personal Health Information 
The second prong of the regulations would establish guidelines for 
the use of any PHI shared and collected on social networking sites. 
Attaching protection to the information itself would be more 
meaningful and long lasting than trying to regulate the fast-paced 
evolution of the technology, while also respecting the intrinsic value 
and basic premise of social networking. 189 Current federal protections 
already take the approach that the PHI itself deserves protection190 
and apply regulations to broad categories of health care industry 
actors. 191 Regulating social networking sites' use of PHI could follow 
HIP AA's approach to regulating "covered entities. "192 By the same 
approach, regulating the vast network of other firms, advertisers, data 
188. This portion of the regulations should be developed by HHS in 
conjunction with the FTC. so that the expertise of both agencies could 
be incorporated into this pivotal provision. For a summary of each 
agency's areas of expertise, see About the Federal Trade Commission, 
Fed. Trade Comm'n, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2013); What We Do, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html/ (last visited Mar. 14, 
2013). 
189. See supra Part III.A. 
190. See supra Part I. 
191. See supra Part II.A. 
192. See supra Parts I, II.A. 
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storage companies, and so forth, is akin to regulating "business 
associates. "193 
The regulations would provide guidelines to social networking 
sites on what is permissible use of PHI. Social networking sites 
should not· be allowed to collect or distribute this PHI from user's 
profiles and interactions. The only exception to this would be if the 
sites de-identified the information and no longer linked it to the 
individual or his online profile or persona. The de-identified 
information could be collected and used for research purposes, but 
directed advertisements should not be allowed unless requested by the 
user. 
The regulations should also provide guidelines to third party 
companies that gather or receive information from social networking 
sites. PHI should be a protected category of information that cannot 
be used for marketing, advertising, or further distribution, unless the 
user grants specific, informed consent. Just as the HITECH Act gives 
individuals the right to know who has accessed their PHI, 194 the 
proposed regulations would confer a similar right. Once PHI is 
collected and distributed outside the realm of the social networking 
sites themselves, users would have a right to know who else has 
accessed that information. Third party companies-the "business 
associates" of social networking sites-wo:u.ld still be responsible to the 
users based on the nature of the PHI. !· 
3. Available Actions and Remedies 
Implementing the above-mentioned privacy disclosures and 
regulations would establish a framework that would decrease the· 
incidence of harm to users from PHI disclosures. It would establish 
much of the needed preventative protection and decrease reliance on 
less effective retrospective remedies. However, in recognizing that not 
all harms can be prevented, the third prong of the regulations should 
establish several courses of action and meaningful remedies for both 
individual social networking users and social networking websites. 
The regulations should also create a cause of action for individuals 
whose PHI has been inappropriately disclosed by social networking 
sites or their third party affiliates: "wrongful distribution of PHI." 
Such a cause of action would abandon the constraints of traditional 
causes of action and their focus on physical space. 
The initial step in pursuing this cause of action should be for the 
user to request an administrative preliminary injunction. A social 
networking user who suspects his PHI has been compromised would 
193. See supra Parts I, II.A. 
194. HITECH Act,, 123 Stat. 230, P.L. 115-5, §13405(c)(l)(B) (codified as 
amended 42 U.S.C. 17935) ("an individual shall have a right to receive 
an accounting of disclosures ... "). 
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without the user's affirmative authorization. In addition to the pop-
up privacy policy review, any change in user-controlled privacy 
settings should be subject to a similar walkthrough and would be at 
the user's discretion to accept or reject. Finally, sites should be 
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inaccurate understanding of the privacy or control their posts are 
afforded. 
2. Guidelines for Use of Personal Health Information 
The second prong of the regulations would establish guidelines for 
the use of any PHI shared and collected on social networking sites. 
Attaching protection to the information itself would be more 
meaningful and long lasting than trying to regulate the fast-paced 
evolution of the technology, while also respecting the intrinsic value 
and basic premise of social networking. 189 Current federal protections 
already take the approach that the PHI itself deserves protection190 
and apply regulations to broad categories of health care industry 
actors. 191 Regulating social networking sites' use of PHI could follow 
HIP AA's approach to regulating "covered entities."192 By the same 
approach, regulating the vast network of other firms, advertisers, data 
188. This portion of the regulations should be developed by HHS in 
conjunction with the FTC. so that the expertise of both agencies could 
be incorporated into this pivotal provision. For a summary of each 
agency's areas of expertise, see About the Federal Trade Commission, 
Fed. Trade Comm'n, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2013); What We Do, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html/ (last visited Mar. 14, 
2013). 
189. See supra Part III.A. 
190. See supra Part I. 
191. See supra Part II.A. 
192. See supra Parts I, II.A. 
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storage companies, and so forth, is akin to regulating "business 
associates. "193 
The regulations would provide guidelines to social networking 
sites on what is permissible use of PHI. Social networking sites 
should not· be allowed to collect or distribute this PHI from user's 
profiles and interactions. The only exception to this would be if the 
sites de-identified the information and no longer linked it to the 
individual or his online profile or persona. The de-identified 
information could be collected and used for research purposes, but 
directed advertisements should not be allowed unless requested by the 
user. 
The regulations should also provide guidelines to third party 
companies that gather or receive information from social networking 
sites. PHI should be a protected category of information that cannot 
be used for marketing, advertising, or further distribution, unless the 
user grants specific, informed consent. Just as the HITECH Act gives 
individuals the right to know who has accessed their PHI, 194 the 
proposed regulations would confer a similar right. Once PHI is 
collected and distributed outside the realm of the social networking 
sites themselves, users would have a right to know who else has 
accessed that information. Third party companies-the "business 
associates" of social networking sites-wop.ld still be responsible to the 
users based on the nature of the PHI. !: 
3. Available Actions and Remedies 
Implementing the above-mentioned privacy disclosures and 
regulations would establish a framework that would decrease the· 
incidence of harm to users from PHI disclosures. It would establish 
much of the needed preventative protection and decrease reliance on 
less effective retrospective remedies. However, in recognizing that not 
all harms can be prevented, the third prong of the regulations should 
establish several courses of action and meaningful remedies for both 
individual social networking users and social networking websites. 
The regulations should also create a cause of action for individuals 
whose PHI has been inappropriately disclosed by social networking 
sites or their third party affiliates: "wrongful distribution of PHI." 
Such a cause of action would abandon the constraints of traditional 
causes of action and their focus on physical space. 
The initial step in pursuing this cause of action should be for the 
user to request an administrative preliminary injunction. A social 
networking user who suspects his PHI has been compromised would 
193. See supra Parts I, II.A. 
194. HITECH Act,, 123 Stat. 230, P.L. 115-5, §13405(c)(l)(B) (codified as 
amended 42 U.S.C. 17935) ("an individual shall have a right to receive 
an accounting of disclosures ... "). 
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file a complaint with the administrative tribunal in his jurisdiction 
designated to hear these complaints. This tribunal should evaluate 
the claim in the light most favorable to the individual and could then 
issue a preliminary injunction, requiring the accused site or affiliate to 
remove or cease use of the contested information. The administrative 
tribunal should then issue an opinion on whether the information 
qualifies as PHI and, if so, whether it has been inappropriately used 
or disclosed. These opinions should be published for precedential 
value on which users, social networking sites, and decision-makers in 
the other tribunals could rely. 
Both parties would be entitled to appeal through a separate 
agency arbitration process. The decisions of these arbitrations should 
be reasoned awards, explaining the facts and reasons for the decision 
and should be available as precedent to the tribunals. If the 
individual prevailed, he should be entitled to damages as calculated 
for pain and suffering and/ or damage to reputation. 195 The social 
networking site or third party affiliate should be required to stop 
using the contested information. Further, the site should be required 
to contact any other sites to which they distributed the information 
to alert them to stop using the information. It should remain up to 
the individual's discretion whether to keep the information posted on 
his social networking page, but the site should not be allowed to use 
that information. If the social networking site prevailed, however, it 
would be entitled to use the information. Finally, appeal to the 
courts would be available to the individuals and social networking· 
sites. 
In addition to the cause of action established primarily for the 
benefit of individuals, there should also be a course of action available 
to the social networking sites themselves that would aid in 
understanding the limits imposed by the regulations. Sites should be 
permitted to request a "ruling letter" from HHS to evaluate proposed 
uses and disclosures of information. These ruling letters should serve 
as advisory opinions, and could provide another preventative avenue 
for decreasing harms to users. Such preventative measures would 
further decrease the need for retrospective actions. 
B. Advantages of the Proposed Regulations 
These proposed regulations provide three primary benefits. First, 
the regulations would fill the current gap in the law between the 
realities of social networking and protections for PHI. Second, they 
would provide a meaningful process to resolve disputes and obtain 
remedies. Third, and most importantly, they would set out clear 
expectations for all parties involved in social networking and help 
195. This is similar to the damages available for the tort of defamation. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 621 (1977). 
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preempt disputes. Together, these benefits would result in an online 
environment that aligns with users' current expectations, 
meaningfully guides businesses and courts, and sets precedent to 
inform future discussions as other similar issues arise. 
1. Fill the Current Gap in the Law Between the Realities of Social 
Networking and Protections for PHI 
The proposed regulations would bring protection for PHI shared 
in social networking forward from where HIP AA and HITECH 
stopped short. They would also eliminate the need for the fragmented 
and outdated state protection. The proposed regulations would fill 
the gap that has resulted from the convergence of privacy values, the 
value placed on PHI, and the rapidly evolving area of social 
networking. 
PHI shared in social networking interactions is currently 
unprotected and therefore vulnerable, especially through third-party 
use. If an individual divulges PHI, even if in a forum that is not as 
"traditionally" private as others are, the information still retains the 
inherent character that American society feels strongly should be 
protected. The proposed regulations would update the law to 
effectuate this value. 
2. Afford Meaningful Dispute Resolution Options and Remedies 
Meaningful remedies do not just mean satisfaction to an injured 
plaintiff; they also entail remedies that reflect the context in which 
the wrong was committed.196 · The proposed regulations outline an 
efficient process for dispute resolution that recognizes the unique 
character of wrongs in a social networking context. This approach 
results in simplicity, uniformity, and consistency of remedies to the 
advantage of all parties involved. 
The proposed regulations ensure that decision-makers-the 
administrative tribunals, arbitrators, and courts-would have 
precedent on which to base their decisions. Complicating the current 
ability to shape meaningful remedies is the phenomenon of the 
"vanishing trial. "197 With more and more disputes resolved through 
private methods of alternative dispute resolution, the number of 
precedential decisions from the courts has diminished, especially in 
the social networking context; this, in turn, has diminished the 
196. See Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, !bi Remedium: The Fundamental Right 
to A Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1642 
(2004) (discussing what makes a meaningful remedy). 
197. Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the 'Vanishing Trial': What We 
Know-And What We Don't, 10 DrsP. RESOL. MAG. 7 (Summer 2004) 
(explaining why alternative dispute resolution methods are decreasing 
the frequency of trials). 
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file a complaint with the administrative tribunal in his jurisdiction 
designated to hear these complaints. This tribunal should evaluate 
the claim in the light most favorable to the individual and could then 
issue a preliminary injunction, requiring the accused site or affiliate to 
remove or cease use of the contested information. The administrative 
tribunal should then issue an opinion on whether the information 
qualifies as PHI and, if so, whether it has been inappropriately used 
or disclosed. These opinions should be published for precedential 
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to alert them to stop using the information. It should remain up to 
the individual's discretion whether to keep the information posted on 
his social networking page, but the site should not be allowed to use 
that information. If the social networking site prevailed, however, it 
would be entitled to use the information. Finally, appeal to the 
courts would be available to the individuals and social networking· 
sites. 
In addition to the cause of action established primarily for the 
benefit of individuals, there should also be a course of action available 
to the social networking sites themselves that would aid in 
understanding the limits imposed by the regulations. Sites should be 
permitted to request a "ruling letter" from HHS to evaluate proposed 
uses and disclosures of information. These ruling letters should serve 
as advisory opinions, and could provide another preventative avenue 
for decreasing harms to users. Such preventative measures would 
further decrease the need for retrospective actions. 
B. Advantages of the Proposed Regulations 
These proposed regulations provide three primary benefits. First, 
the regulations would fill the current gap in the law between the 
realities of social networking and protections for PHI. Second, they 
would provide a meaningful process to resolve disputes and obtain 
remedies. Third, and most importantly, they would set out clear 
expectations for all parties involved in social networking and help 
195. This is similar to the damages available for the tort of defamation. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 621 (1977). 
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preempt disputes. Together, these benefits would result in an online 
environment that aligns with users' current expectations, 
meaningfully guides businesses and courts, and sets precedent to 
inform future discussions as other similar issues arise. 
1. Fill the Current Gap in the Law Between the Realities of Social 
Networking and Protections for PHI 
The proposed regulations would bring protection for PHI shared 
in social networking forward from where HIP AA and HITECH 
stopped short. They would also eliminate the need for the fragmented 
and outdated state protection. The proposed regulations would fill 
the gap that has resulted from the convergence of privacy values, the 
value placed on PHI, and the rapidly evolving area of social 
networking. 
PHI shared in social networking interactions is currently 
unprotected and therefore vulnerable, especially through third-party 
use. If an individual divulges PHI, even if in a forum that is not as 
"traditionally" private as others are, the information still retains the 
inherent character that American society feels strongly should be 
protected. The proposed regulations would update the law to 
effectuate this value. 
2. Afford Meaningful Dispute Resolution Options and Remedies 
Meaningful remedies do not just mean satisfaction to an injured 
plaintiff; they also entail remedies that reflect the context in which 
the wrong was committed.196 · The proposed regulations outline an 
efficient process for dispute resolution that recognizes the unique 
character of wrongs in a social networking context. This approach 
results in simplicity, uniformity, and consistency of remedies to the 
advantage of all parties involved. 
The proposed regulations ensure that decision-makers-the 
administrative tribunals, arbitrators, and courts-would have 
precedent on which to base their decisions. Complicating the current 
ability to shape meaningful remedies is the phenomenon of the 
"vanishing trial. "197 With more and more disputes resolved through 
private methods of alternative dispute resolution, the number of 
precedential decisions from the courts has diminished, especially in 
the social networking context; this, in turn, has diminished the 
196. See Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right 
to A Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1642 
(2004) (discussing what makes a meaningful remedy). 
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(explaining why alternative dispute resolution methods are decreasing 
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441 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Personal Health Information Shared Via Social Networking 
influence jurisprudence has on shaping social norms involving PHI.198 
The proposed regulations would provide decision-makers with a 
foundation based in the reality of online social networking and not in 
antiquated understandings of privacy based on physical space. 
Requiring published, reasoned awards would provide structure and 
bridge the gap left by diminishing precedential opinions. 
3. Preempt Disputes Through Clear Expectations for All Parties 
Involved 
Perhaps the most meaningful impact stemming from these 
proposed regulations is that they would convey clear expectations for 
the use of PHI disclosed in social networking. Understa!lding what is 
expected regarding PHI would inform and guide the conduct of users, 
the social networking sites and third-party affiliates, and would help 
to preempt disputes. 
The proposed reglliations would comport with many of the 
expectations already held by online social networking users. 199 In 
addition to meeting current expectations of privacy, meaningful 
privacy disclosures would set realistic expectations for social 
networking users of what is and is not protected in their online 
interactions. The combination of knowledge and proposed regulatory 
. protections would provide for more control over that information. 
This paradigm would give users confidence in knowing both the 
boundaries of protection and the limits on how their PHI can be used, 
as well as comfort in knowing there are penalties for inappropriate use 
and disclosure. It would also place a burden of responsibility on 
users; as they are more informed, they will be expected to participate 
in the responsible management of their PHI. The proposed 
regulations would set clear expectations for users and encourage 
informed participation in protection of PHI. 
Social networking sites and their third-party affiliates would also 
benefit from the clear expectations set out in the proposed 
regulations. Understanding what is permissible regarding PHI would 
decrease the amount of confusion and litigation. Sites would be 
better able to protect against liability by complying with the 
regulations. As a result, they would be spared the costs-of money, 
time, and reputation-of litigation arising from a lack of legal 
guidelines. 200 
198. Id. 
199. See supra Part III.A. 
200. Preemption of disputes and the proposed resolution process would save 
judicial resources as well. 
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V. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS 
Addressing the emerging issue of privacy for PHI in online social 
networking will not only align with users' current privacy 
expectations and quell worries about inappropriate disclosure, but also 
assist in resolving similar problems in the future. This Note has 
focused on PHI specifically, but the proposed regulations could also 
serve as a framework for other categories of information deemed 
worthy of protection. Similarly, this focus can be expanded beyond 
social networking to address concerns about the practices of data 
mining and usage generally. 201 
CONCLUSION 
Social networking challenges the value American society places on 
PHI protection as a highly vulnerable category of information. With 
HIP AA, the HITECH Act, and their attendant regulations confirming 
this value,202 the need for protections in social networking cannot be 
overlooked. The reality of social networking's ubiquity, popularity, 
and rapid evolution renders arguments such as "just don't post it" 
moot.203 PHI disclosure has a unique potential for negative 
consequences; embarrassment, discrimination, and damage to 
relationships are but a few of the potential harms. 204 Forward-
looking, preventative federal regulations will provide the most 
protection for PHI shared in a social networking context. 
Current regulations do not extend into this area. 205 Additionally, 
the law varies state to state, ignoring the reality that social 
networking is unrestricted by geographic borders. 206 Similarly, 
frameworks rooted in a concept of physical space are a poor fit for 
wrongs in the online world.207 Finally, retrospective rather than 
proactive schemes are insufficient to address the potential damage 
through inappropriate disclosure of PHI online. 208 Waiting to address 
201. Another area where these regulations could have a positive impact 
would be in patient-managed electronic medical records. As patients 
i1:1cr~~singly begin to ~anage their own patient records electronically, 
s1gmficant acces.s and disclosure issues will arise. See Terry, supra note 
76 (outlining a framework to address issues between doctors and 
patients regarding electronic medical records). 
202. See supra Part I. 
203. See supra Part III.A. 
204. See supra part I. 
205. See supra part II.A. 
206. See supra Part II.B.l. 
207. See supra Part II.B.2. 
208. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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influence jurisprudence has on shaping social norms involving PHI.198 
The proposed regulations would provide decision-makers with a 
foundation based in the reality of online social networking and not in 
antiquated understandings of privacy based on physical space. 
Requiring published, reasoned awards would provide structure and 
bridge the gap left by diminishing precedential opinions. 
3. Preempt Disputes Through Clear Expectations for All Parties 
Involved 
Perhaps the most meaningful impact stemming from these 
proposed regulations is that they would convey clear expectations for 
the use of PHI disclosed in social networking. Understanding what is 
expected regarding PHI would inform and guide the conduct of users, 
the social networking sites and third-party affiliates, and would help 
to preempt disputes. 
The proposed regulations would comport with many of the 
expectations already held by online social networking users. 199 In 
addition to meeting current expectations of privacy, meaningful 
privacy disclosures would set realistic expectations for social 
networking users of what is and is not protected in their online 
interactions. The combination of knowledge and proposed regulatory 
_protections would provide for more control over that information. 
This paradigm would give users confidence in knowing both the 
boundaries of protection and the limits on how their PHI can be used, 
as well as comfort in knowing there are penalties for inappropriate use 
and disclosure. It would also place a burden of responsibility on 
users; as they are more informed, they will be expected to participate 
in the responsible management of their PHI. The proposed 
regulations would set clear expectations for users and encourage 
informed participation in protection of PHI. 
Social networking sites and their third-party affiliates would also 
benefit from the clear expectations set out in the proposed 
regulations. Understanding what is permissible regarding PHI would 
decrease the amount of confusion and litigation. Sites would be 
better able to protect against liability by complying with the 
regulations. As a result, they would be spared the costs-of money, 
time, and reputation-of litigation arising from a lack of legal 
guidelines.200 
198. Id. 
199. See supra Part III.A. 
200. Preemption of disputes and the proposed resolution process would save 
judicial resources as well. 
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V. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS 
Addressing the emerging issue of privacy for PHI in online social 
networking will not only align with users' current privacy 
expectations and quell worries about inappropriate disclosure, but also 
assist in resolving similar problems in the future. This Note has 
focused on PHI specifically, but the proposed regulations could also 
serve as a framework for other categories of information deemed 
worthy of protection. Similarly, this focus can be expanded beyond 
social networking to address concerns about the practices of data 
mining and usage generally. 201 
CONCLUSION 
Social networking challenges the value American society places on 
PHI protection as a highly vulnerable category of information. With 
HIP AA, the HITECH Act, and their attendant regulations confirming 
this value,202 the need for protections in social networking cannot be 
overlooked. The reality of social networking's ubiquity, popularity, 
and rapid evolution renders arguments such as "just don't post it" 
moot.203 PHI disclosure has a unique potential for negative 
consequences; embarrassment, discrimination, and damage to 
relationships are but a few of the potential harms. 204 Forward-
looking, preventative federal regulations will provide the most 
protection for PHI shared in a social networking context. 
Current regulations do not extend into this area. 205 Additionally, 
the law varies state to state, ignoring the reality that social 
networking is unrestricted by geographic borders. 206 Similarly, 
frameworks rooted in a concept of physical space are a poor fit for 
wrongs in the online world. 207 Finally, retrospective rather than 
proactive schemes are insufficient to address the potential damage 
through inappropriate disclosure of PHI online. 208 Waiting to address 
201. Another area where these regulations could have a positive impact 
would be in patient-managed electronic medical records. As patients 
increasingly begin to manage their own patient records electronically 
significant access and disclosure issues will arise. See Terry, supra not~ 
76 (outlining a framework to address issues between doctors and 
patients regarding electronic medical records). 
202. See supra Part I. 
203. See supra Part III.A. 
204. See supra part I. 
205. See supra part II.A. 
206. See supra Part II.B.l. 
207. See supra Part II.B.2. 
208. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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the problem until information is inappropriately disclosed results in 
little opportunity for a meaningful remedy. 
Federal regulations would protect the value placed on control of 
PHI by attaching protection to the information itself. It is more 
realistic to place restrictions on what can be done with acquired 
information than to attempt detailed regulation of this rapidly 
evolving industry.209 While users should also participate in the 
protection of their personal information through use of the privacy 
settings afforded, deceptive privacy advertisement and obtuse privacy 
policies should not render this participation meaningless. 
Preemptively establishing a set of federal regulations as a benchmark 
for addressing these kinds of issues before they arise will help mitigate 
the harms that are otherwise sure to follow. Federal regulations 
requiring meaningful privacy disclosures and truthful advertising, 
establishing guidelines for use of PHI, and providing causes of action 
with precedential value would keep pace with reality of the evolution 
of online social networking. 
Federal regulations protecting PHI would fill the gap in the 
current law, provide meaningful dispute resolution options and 
remedies, and delineate concrete expectations for all participants. 
The permanence of information posted online heightens the need for 
this sort of protection. 210 It is all too likely that information posted 
will become a permanent part of an individual's "digital" persona 
without the mercy of short human memory.211 Such a framework will 
have broad applicability as more and more interactions move toward 
online exchanges. 
209. See supra Part IV.A. 
210. See supra Part III.B. 
211. Abril, supra note 19, at 75 (discussing how "the digital record has 
increased 'the stakes of privacy today ... "). 
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HIT LOSERS: THE GOOD (FAITH) 
FIGHT FOR NET-PROFITS PAYMENTS 
FROM BLOCKBUSTER HOLLYWOOD 
PRODUCTIONS 
Max Bialystock: You were saying that, under the right 
circumstances, a producer could make more money with a flop 
than he could with a hit. 
Leo Bloom: Yes. It's quite possible. 
Max Bialystock: You keep saying that, but you don't say how! 
Leo Bloom: Well, it's simply a matter of creative accounting. 1 
Gould: I think conservatively, you and me, we build ourselves 
in to split, ten percent. (Pause.) 
Fox: Of the net. 
Gould: Char. Charlie: Permit me to tell you: two things I've 
learned, twenty-five years in the entertainment industry. 
Fox: What? 
Gould: The two things which are always true. 
Fox: One: 
Gould: The first one is: there is no net. 
Fox: Yeah ... ? (Pause.) 
Gould: And I forgot the second one. 2 . 
Neal Robin3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Contracts for services on an entertainment project contain many 
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